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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article encapsulates the history, issues, and current state of
the law regarding the doctrine of jury nullification. Part II discusses
the arguments that proponents of jury nullification set forth and
highlights the weaknesses of these arguments. Part III offers an
overview of the English and colonial American history of nullifica-
tion through the late nineteenth century, when American courts
terminated the right of juries to nullify the law. Part IV reviews
twentieth-century case law on jury nullification in both federal and
California courts. Part V presents an overview of recent cases in
which nullification may have played a role. Part VI presents the ar-
guments in support of nullification. Part VII reviews the "voir dire"
process, including its history and scope. It instructs lawyers and
judges on how to conduct voir dire to minimize the risk of nullifica-
tion and presents a discussion of what judges and lawyers can do
when confronted with a jury that nullifies the law. Part VIII discusses
recent legislative efforts in California that endorse nullification and
how they have fared. °
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II. PRINCIPLES OF ANARCHY VERSUS THE RULE OF LAW
Jury nullification occurs when a jury ignores the law as given by
the court and chooses instead to play by its own rules. Proponents of
jury nullification claim that it tempers law with justice and brings the
common sense of the average citizen and the "community con-
science"1 to bear on individual cases, supplying needed flexibility and
equity to the law. In so doing, the nullifying jury serves as a mini-
legislature, repealing laws it deems unjust or preventing what it sees
as the harsh, inequitable application of law in certain cases.
Despite the merits of these arguments, nullification results in in-
consistent application of laws, allows bad law to remain on the books,
and permits juries to disregard the law without accountability.3 This
disregard gives juries unreviewable, unchecked power and results in
arbitrary judicial results.4 When legislatures make law that violates
the so-called conscience of the community, their acts are reviewable
by voters, who can cast votes against their legislators at election time.
Between elections, constituents can write to their legislators and ex-
press their opposition. By giving a jury nullification instruction,
judges ask jurors to act as "mini-legislators," placing too burdensome
a duty upon those individuals who are compelled to serve on jury
duty.5
If it is true that "[t]he public conscience must be satisfied that
fairness dominates the administration of justice,"6 then it follows that
laws must be given consistent application. If jury nullification were a
common practice, laws would change from day to day, leading to an-
archy,7 rather than a society where all must live by the same stan-
1. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (explaining that
respect for nullification flows from the jury's role as the "conscience of the com-
nunity" in the criminal justice system); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d
1113, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (denying petitioner's request for a jury nullification instruction on the
grounds that the jury has no right to be instructed on its prerogative to disregard
the instructions of the court, even in matters of law).
2. See Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1142 & n.8.
3. See id. at 1133-34.
4. See id.; see also Franklin Delano Strier, On Nullification: Don't Let Some
Juries Write Their Own Rules, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 17, 1995, at 6 [hereinafter
Strier, Own Rules] (noting that encouraging individuals to decide based on their
own conscience invites chaos and anarchy).
5. See Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1136.
6. Adams v. United States ex reL McCann, 317 U.S. 269,279 (2d Cir. 1942).
7. See Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1133-34.
To encourage individuals to make their own determinations as to which
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dards. Juries are not impaneled to solve social problems The jury's
duty is to apply the facts to the law as stated by the court and reach a
verdict consistent with this law.9
III. HISTORY
The concept of jury nullification dates back to sixteenth-century
England.'0 In 1649 Lieutenant Colonel John Lilburne was prosecuted
for publishing pamphlets critical of the British government, in viola-
tion of treason laws.1 Lilburne was denied assistance of counsel"2 and
requested an opportunity to speak to the jury himself.1 3 He expressed
to the court his belief that "[t]he jury [members] .. .are not only
laws they will obey and which they will permit themselves as a matter of
conscience to disobey is to invite chaos. No legal system could long
survive if it gave every individual the option of disregarding with impu-
nity any law which by his personal standard judged morally untenable.
Id. (quoting Judge Sobeloff in United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1009 (4th
Cir. 1969)).
8. See James P. Pinkerton, Nullification: Wrong in 1832 and in 1995, L.A.
TIMEs, Oct. 12, 1995, at B9 (quoting Susan Estrich, a professor at USC Law Cen-
ter, following the O.J. Simpson verdict).
9. The Supreme Court has stated:
We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United
States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the
court and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the
evidence. Upon the court rests the responsibility of declaring the law;
upon the jury, the responsibility of applying the law so declared to the
facts as they, upon their conscience, believe them to be. Under any
other system, the courts, although established in order to declare the
law, would for every practical purpose be eliminated from our system of
government as instrumentalities devised for the protection equally of
society and of individuals in their essential rights. When that occurs our
government will cease to be a government of laws, and become a gov-
ernment of men. Liberty regulated by law is the underlying principle of
our institutions.y t l n
Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102-03 (1895).
10. See Lt. Commander Robert E. Korroch & Major Michael J. Davidson,
Jury Nullification: A Call for Justice or an Invitation to Anarchy?, 139 MIL. L.
REv. 131, 133-34 (1993).
11. See THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE
PERSPECrIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200-1800, at 153-56
(1985); The Trial of Lieutenant Colonel John Lilburne (1 Car. 1 1649), reprinted
in 4 HOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1270, 1291-94
(London, T.C. Hansard 1816) [hereinafter Lilburne]; Philip B. Scott, Jury Nullifi-
cation: An Historical Perspective on a Modern Debate, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 389,
397-99 (1989); M. Kristine Creagan, Note, Jury Nullification: Assessing Recent
Legislative Developments, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1101, 1103-05 (1993).
12. See GREEN, supra note 11, at 135-36 (stating that the accused was not al-
lowed assistance of counsel until 1696 for treason, and in all other capital cases
until the 18th century).
13. See id. at 173.
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judges of fact, but of law also: [the court is only the pronouncer of
the jury's] . . . verdict.' ' 14 Lieutenant Colonel Lilburne was prose-
cuted a second time in 1653."s His punishment, if convicted, was
death. 6 Defending himself again, Lilburne argued that the jury
should acquit him if it believed that the "proscribed punishment was
unconscionably severe in light of the acts proved to have been com-
mitted by [him]."' 7 The jury returned a verdict of "'not guilty of any
crime worthy of death."' 8
In 1671 Bushell's Case established that jurors could not be pun-
ished for returning verdicts the court considered incorrect.19 William
Penn and William Mead were prosecuted for preaching before an
unlawful assembly and disturbing the peace."° Despite admitting at
trial that they had assembled a large crowd on the streets of London,
Penn argued that the facts as alleged failed to show that any law was
broken.2 Penn maintained that the indictment, therefore, was ille-
gal and that the jurors should use their consciences to decide
whether he and Mead were guilty." The judge instructed the jury,
implying that they must return a guilty verdict.' After a half hour of
deliberation, only eight of the twelve jurors wanted to convict." The
court threatened the four dissenting jurors after they refused to con-
vict Penn and Mead." The jury then returned a verdict finding Penn
guilty of preaching to an assembly2n but refused to say whether the as-
sembly was unlawful.' Sent back again, it returned with a verdict of
not guilty for Mead and a guilty verdict for preaching to an assembly
14. Id.
15. See id. at 195-97.
16. See id. at 193.
17. Id at 159-60.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 246-49.
20. See Trial of Penn and Mead, reprinted in 6 T.B. HOWELL, A COMPLETE
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALs 951, 951-55 (London, T.C. Hansard 1816)
[hereinafter Penn & Mead's Case]; Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification:
Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 701 (1995); Alan
W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 168,202-
03 (1972).
21. See Penn & Mead's Case, supra note 20, at 958-59.
22. See id.; GREEN, supra note 11, at 223.
23. See Penn & Mead's Case, supra note 20, at 959-60.
24. See id. at 960-61.
25. See id. at 961.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 962.
28. See id.
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for Penn.29 By refusing to find the assembly unlawful, the jury essen-
tially acquitted both men?7
Following the reading of their verdict, the jurors were instructed:
Gentlemen, you shall not be dismissed till we have a verdict
that the court will accept; and you shall be locked up, with-
out meat, drink, fire, and tobacco; you shall not think thus
to abuse the court; we will have a verdict, by the help of
God, or you shall starve for it."
The jury was ordered back to reconsider the verdict." The foreman
of the jury, Bushell, objected to the order on the ground that the jury
had reached a verdict and that any other decision by them would be
given only to save their lives." The jurors were imprisoned until they
paid fines set by the court.'
Bushell filed a writ of habeas corpus seeking his release. The
Court of Common Pleas held that courts could not punish jurors in
criminal cases for voting to acquit, even when the trial judge believed
that the verdict was inconsistent with the evidence." With one ex-
ception, all the judges in England concurred with this opinion of
Chief Justice Sir John Vaughan.' Commentators have stated that
this decision created the right of juries to nullify." However, this is
incorrect; the Chief Justice did not hold that juries had a right to nul-
lify. Rather, "he implied that no such right exists, but that the de
facto power to nullify without fear of punishment is justified only be-
cause nullification is not provable."39
Instances of jury nullification began to increase during the eight-
eenth century and were common in the early nineteenth century in
seditious libel prosecutions.' William Davis Shipley was prosecuted
for seditious libel in 1783. 4' The jury was instructed that its only de-
29. See id. at 962-63.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 963.
32. See id. at 964.
33. See id. at 966.
34. See id. at 967-68.
35. See Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 999, 1000 (1670).
36. See id. at 1012.
37. See id. at 1013-14.
38. See Korroch & Davidson, supra note 10, at 134.
39. Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, Jury Nullification and Jury-Control Procedures,
65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 825,830 (1990).
40. See Korroch & Davidson, supra note 10, at 134.
41. See Proceedings against the Dean of St. Asaph, 23 Geo. 3 (1784), reprinted
in 21 T.B. HOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 847 (London,
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cision was whether there was in fact a publication, an issue upon
which there was no dispute.42 They were told not to consider any of-
fered justification.4 In closing argument, Shipley's attorney told the
jurors that they should not obey the court's rulings and argued:
They therefore call upon you to pronounce that guilt, which
they forbid you to examine into. Thus without inquiry into
the only circumstance which can constitute guilt, and with-
out meaning to find the defendant guilty, you may be se-
duced into a judgment which your consciences may revolt
at, and your speech to the world deny-I shall not agree that
you are therefore bound to find the defendant guilty unless
you think so likewise.'
The most famous early American case involving jury nullifica-
tion was the trial of John Peter Zenger.45 Zenger was a New York
printer who published a newspaper severely critical of the state's
governor.4" As a result, he was charged with seditious libel In pre-
Revolutionary days, seditious libel was defined as criticism directed
against the government or public officials." It was considered a
threat against public order and a criminal offense.49 Zenger's crimi-
nal trial began on August 4, 1735,50 with Andrew Hamilton as his de-
fense attorney." In a prosecution for seditious libel, the truth of the
statement was not a recognized defense." The Attorney General
needed only to prove that Zenger had printed or published the
statement. 3 The judge "would then instruct the jury that the words
were scandalous, libelous, a threat to the public order and that they
T.C. Hansard 1816) [hereinafter St. Asaph's Case].
42. See id. at 851.
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. See Trial of John Peter Zenger, 9 Geo. 2 (1735), reprinted in 17 T.B.
HOWELL, COBBEIT'S COMPLETE COLLECION OF STATE TRIALS 675 (London,
T.C. Hansard 1816) [hereinafter Zenger]; William R. Glendon, The Trial of John
Peter Zenger, 68 N.Y. ST. B.J., Dec. 1996, at 48.
46. See Zenger, supra note 45, at 675-82.
47. See id.
48. See Glendon, supra note 45, at 48.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 50.
51. See id.
52. See id.; Todd Barnet, New York Considers Jury Nullification: Informing
the Jury of Its Common Law Right to Decide Both Facts and Law, N.Y. ST. B.J.
40, 41 (1993).
53. See Zenger, supra note 45, at 694; Glendon, supra note 45, at 48.
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could therefore find the defendant guilty." 4 "Hamilton's strategy
was to concede the factual question of whether publication had oc-
curred, and argue the legal question of whether truth should be a de-
fense [to the charge of seditious libel.]"55 He "conceded that Zenger
had printed and published the offending papers but demanded that
the prosecution prove them to be false."56 In response, the Attorney
General argued that the statement was no less a libel simply because
it was true.' The Court refused to allow Hamilton to prove the truth
of the facts published in the papers, prohibiting him from calling any
witnesses on the subject. 8 The only way Hamilton could gain Zenger
an acquittal was to rely on the jurors' own notions of truth of the al-
legations in the paper because the law was completely against him.9
He urged jurors to uphold freedom and asked them "to see with their
own eyes, to hear with their own ears, and to make use of their own
consciences and understandings in judging of the lives, liberties or es-
tates of their fellow subjects. ' 60 The jury returned a verdict of not
guilty-61 It is asserted that though a nullified verdict, the outcome of
Zenger's case strengthened freedom of the press.62
In the early history of the American colonies, and for a time af-
ter the Revolution, criminal juries enjoyed the right to decide ques-
tions of both law and fact.6 In Georgia v. Brailsford," a 1794 civil
case, Supreme Court Chief Justice John Jay instructed the jury on the
law, which he explained it should take from the court.65 He further
expressed that the jury had the right to decide the proper law as well
as the facts. Chief Justice Jay stated, "you [the jury] have neverthe-
lefs a right to take upon yourfelves to judge of both, and to determine
54. Glendon, supra note 45, at 48.
55. John T. Reed, Comment, Penn, Zenger and O.1.: Jury Nullification-
Justice or the "Wacko Fringe's" Attempt to Further Its Anti-Government
Agenda?, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 1125, 1132 (1996); see Zenger, supra note 45, at 693.
56. Glendon, supra note 45, at 50; see also Zenger, supra note 45, at 698-99.
57. See Zenger, supra note 45, at 703.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF
JOHN PETER ZENGER 93 (Stanley Nider Katz ed., 2d ed. 1972).
61. See id. at 101.
62. See Stanley Nider Katz, Introduction to JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF
NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER 1, 1 (Stanley
Nider Katz ed., 2d ed. 1972).
63. See Scheflin, supra note 20, at 174.
64. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794).
65. See id. at 4; Scheflin, supra note 20, at 175-76; Reed, supra note 55, at
1133.
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the law as well as the fact in controverfy." 66
The ability of the jury to determine valid law was diminished by
the courts. The watershed case of Marbury v. Madison67 established
the rule that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."" In 1835 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts decided United States v.
Battiste,9 its first opinion reducing a jury's power to determine the
law 0 Battiste was a member of the crew of the America, a ship that
transported African slaves between ports on the African coast." He
was charged with violating a law that prohibited any U.S. ship from
transporting individuals with the intent to make them slaves, an of-
fense punishable by death.7 Battiste's attorney urged the jury to de-
termine the law on its own.' Justice Joseph Story rejected this argu-
ment. The court reasoned that while juries may have the ability to
nullify laws, they do not have the moral right to take such actions.'
Arguably this holding implies that the court was concerned that if a
jury could decide the law, the law would become uncertain.
The Battiste case was decided at a time in post-Revolutionary
American history when the colonists were in control of their own
government. Judges were no longer a part of the English monarchy
but rather, a part of the newly independent nation. Apparently, the
court was concerned with the country's need for stability in the law.'
Justice Story stated, "[e]very person accused as a criminal has a right
to be tried according to the law of the land... and not by the law as a
jury may understand it, or choose, from wantonness, or ignorance, or
accidental mistake, to interpret it. '76 One could read Justice Story's
reasoning in Battiste to support the modern role of the jury as the
trier of fact.
The trend to diminish a jury's power to nullify continued in
Commonwealth v. Porter.' Ten years after Battiste, the Massachu-
66. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) at 4.
67. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
68. Id. at 177.
69. 24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545).
70. See id. at 1043.
71. See id at 1042.
72. See id at 1044.
73. See id. at 1043.
74. See id.
75. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
76. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. at 1043.
77. 51 Mass. (10 Met.) 263 (1845).
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setts Supreme Court held that a jury could not determine questions
of law.78 Although the court's holding did not follow Massachusetts
precedent, it was not completely inconsistent. While the judge gave
the law to the jury, the defense attorney was still allowed to argue the
law to the jury, ostensibly to allow jurors to better grasp it.7"
The Supreme Court severely limited the ability of juries to de-
termine the law in United States v. Morris.4 Three defendants were
prosecuted in 1851 for aiding and abetting a runaway slave's escape
to Canada in violation of the Fugitive Slave Acts.8 ' During closing
arguments, a defense attorney told the jury that it was the finder of
the law and if it believed that the law was unconstitutional, it could so
hold.'2 The court interrupted and rejected the lawyer's argument.
Justice Benjamin Robbins Curtis, writing for the court, held that ju-
ries do not have the right to decide questions of law.4 He further
held that all actions of the government should apply equally to all
citizens.' 4 Justice Curtis reasoned that if juries had the right to over-
rule precedent and hold statutes unconstitutional, there would be no
"supreme Law of the Land."" If given this power, there would be no
protection from the arbitrary and harsh use of it by the jury.4 The
court also mentioned the fact that Article VI of the Constitution
binds judges but not juriesY
Finally, in 1896 the United States Supreme Court effectively
ended the right of jury nullification in federal court." The seminal
case of Sparf & Hansen v. United States89 represents the final nail in
the coffin for the right of the jury to decide the law. It was Sparf that
defined the role of the modern jury in federal cases. The litigation
involved the prosecution of two sailors for the murder of another
7& See id. at 286; Scheflin, supra note 20, at 178.
79. See Porter, 51 Mass. (10 Met.) at 285-87; Scheflin, supra note 20, at 178.
80. 26 F. Cas. 1323 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No. 15,815).
81. See id. at 1323-31.
82. See id. at 1331.
83. See id. at 1336.
84. See id. at 1332; Reed, supra note 55, at 1135.
85. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. (This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding).
86. See Scheflin, supra note 20, at 179.
87. See Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1332-33.
88. See Scott, supra note 11, at 419.
89. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
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sailor on board an American ship, the Hesper.' The murder statute
under which the defendants were charged provided for the lesser in-
cluded offense of manslaughter.9' At trial, the defendants asked the
court to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense. 92 The trial
judge refused the request and told the jury that there was no evidence
to support such a finding.' During deliberations the jury asked the
court whether the crime committed must have been murder or
whether it could be manslaughter.? The court responded that al-
though in an average case, the verdict may be murder or manslaugh-
ter, in this case manslaughter was not appropriate: "[I]f a felonious
homicide has been committed, the facts of the case do not reduce it
below murder."95 Further,
[i]n a proper case, a verdict for manslaughter may be ren-
dered,... and even in this case you have the physical power
to do so; but as one of the tribunals of the country, a jury is
expected to be governed by law, and the law it should re-
ceive from the court.96
The jury returned a guilty verdict on the murder charge from which
the defendants appealed.
The question presented on appeal was whether "the court tran-
scended its authority when saying ... a jury is expected to be gov-
erned by law, and the law it should receive from the court." 97 In the
lead opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan held that a jury has
the physical power to disregard the law, as laid down to
them by the court. But I deny that.., they have the moral
right to decide the law according to their own notions or
pleasure. On the contrary, I hold it the most sacred consti-
tutional right of every party accused of a crime that the jury
should respond as to the facts, and the court as to the
law .... This is the right of every citizen, and it is his only
protection."
Since 1895 the United States Supreme Court has followed this
90. See id. at 52.
91. See id. at 59.
92 See id.
93. See id. at 59-60.
94. See id. at 61 n.1.
95. Id. at62n.1.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 63 (emphasis omitted).
98. Id. at 74.
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precedent that the right to decide the law belongs to the court, not to
the jury.'
IV. MODERN JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Federal Case Law
Although juries continued to nullify the law after Justice Har-
lan's opinion in Sparf, federal courts did not address the issue be-
tween 1895 and 1960.1' During the 1920s juries repeatedly nullified
in cases involving violations of prohibition statutes."' Nullification
was prevalent in the South during the 1960s in cases of violence
against African Americans and civil rights workers.' °2 Yet, it was not
until the politically charged era of the Vietnam War that the jury
nullification issue reappeared at the legal forefront."°
In 1967 the "Boston Five" were prosecuted for acts arising from
their protests of the war in Vietnam." They were charged with con-
spiracy to help young men avoid the draft.0° Included in this group
were famous pediatrician Benjamin Spock, Marcus Raskin, codirec-
tor of the Institute for Policy Studies, and the Reverend William
Sloan Coffin, chaplain of Yale University."6 At trial, the district
court instructed the jury to return a general verdict of guilty or not
guilty, as well as "yes" or "no" answers to ten "special" questions."
Four of the five defendants were convicted. 8 On appeal, appellants
contended that the submission of special questions was prejudicial er-
ror.0'9 The First Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the differences of
the jury's role in criminal and civil cases. 0 Chief Judge Bailey Ald-
rich noted that while special questions are commonplace in civil
99. See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995); Berra v. United
States, 351 U.S. 131, 134 (1956); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 104
(1909).
100. See Weinberg-Brodt, supra note 39, at 833 n.45.
101. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 292 n.10
(Phoenix ed. 1971).
102. See Kristen K. Sauer, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury About
Mandatory Sentencing Consequences, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1232, 1258-59 (1995).
103. See Weinberg-Brodt, supra note 39, at 836.
104. See PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL 82 (1984).
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180 (1st Cir. 1969).
108. See id. at 168.
109. See id. at 180.
110. See id. at 180-82.
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cases, they are almost nonexistent in the criminal context.' In a civil
case, the judge may order the jury to find against a defendant, regard-
less of the strength of the evidence. The same cannot be done in
criminal cases."' The court asserted that in order for a defendant to
be tried by a jury of his peers, that jury must be free from judicial
pressure and control in rendering its verdict."' The First Circuit ex-
pressed concern with
the subtle, and perhaps open, direct effect that answering
special questions may have upon the jury's ultimate conclu-
sion. There is no easier way to reach, and perhaps force, a
verdict of guilty than to approach it step by step. A juror,
wishing to acquit, may be formally catechized. By a pro-
gression of questions each of which seems to require an an-
swer unfavorable to the defendant, a reluctant juror may be
led to vote for a conviction which, in the large, he would
have resisted.'14
Because the jury is the "conscience of the community," it must
be free to look at more than what the court expects it to focus on."
Further, constitutional due process and jury trial rights demand a jury
free from direct or indirect pressure of the court."6 As such, the court
held that the special questions constituted prejudicial error."7
United States v. Moylan"' was one of the first Vietnam era cases
to look at the right of juries to nullify. In Moylan nine defendants
were prosecuted for burning draft cards in protest of the Vietnam
War.' They were charged with mutilation of government records,
destruction of government property, and interference with the ad-
ministration of the Selective Service System.' All nine admitted the
111. See id. at 180. Judge Aldrich did point out that there is a narrow area of
special criminal cases where questions have been used; however, he implied that
the case at bar was not such a case. See id. at 182.
112. See id. at 180.
113. See id. at 181.
114. Id. at 182.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 183.
118. 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969).
119. See id. at 1003.
120. See id. The violations were of 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (West 1994) (destruction
of government property), 18 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (West 1994) (mutilation of gov-
ernment property), and 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(a) (West 1994) (interference with
selective service system administration). See id. at 1003 n.1.
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acts and were convicted. The defendants appealed their convictions
on two grounds, one being that the trial court erred in refusing to in-
struct the jury on its right to nullify the law.12 They contended that
the trial judge should have informed the jury or allowed defense
counsel to argue that it had the power to acquit the defendants even
if they were clearly guilty of the crimes charged."2 The appellants
maintained that "since the jury has 'the power to bring in a verdict in
the teeth of both law and facts,' then the jury should be told that it
has this power."1 " This argument was based on their contention that
the jury's power to acquit where the law may compel otherwise is
central to democracy. A jury must be so informed to fairly ponder
the actions of the defendants, because society speaks through the jury
in judging fellow citizens and can mitigate a law which society deems
is too harsh." In response to the appellants' assertions, the Fourth
Circuit noted:
We recognize... the undisputed power of the jury to acquit,
even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge
and contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must ex-
ist as long as we adhere to the general verdict in criminal
cases, for the courts cannot search the minds of the jurors to
find the basis upon which they judge. If the jury feels that
the law under which the defendant is accused is unjust, or
that exigent circumstances justified the actions of the ac-
cused, or for any reason which appeals to their logic or pas-
sion, the jury has the power to acquit, and the courts must
abide by that decision.
Despite the previous discussion, the appeals court held that the jury
should not be encouraged to nullify.' The court stated: "[B]y clearly
stating to the jury that they may disregard the law, telling them that
they may decide according to their prejudices or consciences.., we
would indeed be negating the rule of law in favor of the rule of law-
lessness.""
The Ninth Circuit was faced with a similar issue in United States
121. See id. at 1003.
122. See id. at 1004.
123. See id. at 1005.
124. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Homing v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S.
135, 138 (1920)).
125. See id.
126. Id. at 1006.
127. See id.
128. Id.
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v. Simpson.'9 Like the defendants in Moylan, Simpson had burned
Selective Service draft cards in protest of the Vietnam conflict."3
Simpson was prosecuted and convicted?' On appeal, Simpson
claimed, among other things, that the district court erred in refusing
to instruct the jury of its power to acquit a defendant regardless of
the strength of evidence of guilt.m The court approached the issue
presented by asking whether justice would be better served by in-
structing jurors. The instruction would empower the jurors to disre-
gard the law and decide questions of law based on their own judg-
ments and consciences, thereby opening the way for more
"conscience verdicts." ''  The court agreed that the jury has an inde-
pendent role in the judicial system and that juries reach conscience
verdicts without being instructed. m The court determined, however,
that satisfactory safeguards existed for this power so that no further
instruction was necessary. 5 The Ninth Circuit stated that "in the
courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to
take the law from the court, and apply that law to the facts as they
find them to be from the evidence.'" 6 In so holding, the court vail-
129. 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972).
130. See id at 516.
131. See id. at 516-17. The court convicted Simpson of the following statutory
violations: 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (West 1994) (destroying government property), 18
U.S.C. § 2071(a) (West 1994) (mutilating and destroying government records), 50
U.S.C. app. § 462(a) (West 1990) (interfering with the administration of the Se-
lective Service System). See id. at 516-17 nn.1-3.
132- See id. at 518-19. The requested instruction read:
The jury has the power to decide, according to its own judgment and
conscience, all questions of law and fact involved in the issue of guilty or
not guilty.
Juries may apply matter [sic] of fact and law together, and form their
consideration of, and a right judgment upon, both.
The jury has the power to find the defendant not guilty even if the
evidence of guilt is overwhelming or conclusive.
Jurors may not be punished for voting for acquittal, even if the evi-
dence of guilt is overwhelming or conclusive.
Juries have the power to disregard the law in fact in reaching its ver-
dict.
Juries, as representative cross-sections of their communities may, in
conscience cases, nullify the law and the fact if they approve of the con-
ceded acts of defendants.
Id. at 518 n.9.
133. Id. at 519.
134. See id at 520.
135. See id.
136. I& at 519 (quoting Sparf & Hanson v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102
(1895)).
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dated as correct the rule of Sparf, as reiterated in Moylan.n
Less than two months after Judge Walter Raleigh Ely, Jr.'s
opinion in Simpson, the District of Columbia Circuit Court published
its famed Dougherty opinion." Defendants were seven members of
the "D.C. Nine,"1 39 as well as members of the Catholic clergy. ' Each
was charged with one count of second degree burglary and two
counts of destroying private property.4 The prosecution arose from
the break-in, vandalism, and destruction of property of the Washing-
ton, D.C. offices of Dow Chemical Company.4 2 Defendants pro-
tested Dow's manufacture of napalm used in American military ef-
forts in Vietnam.' None of the defendants disputed that they had
entered the office.'" Each defendant was convicted of two counts of
malicious destruction of property.45
On appeal, the defendants asserted that the trial judge erred in
refusing to instruct the jury of its power to nullify the law.'46 Appel-
lants maintained that jurors have a recognized right to disregard the
court's instructions and should be informed of their power. In his
majority opinion, Judge Harold Leventhal noted that the right of jury
nullification, although put forth "in the name of liberty and democ-
racy," is the "ultimate logic of anarchy." s His expressed disavowal
of jury nullification went further:
To encourage individuals to make their own determinations
as to which laws they will obey and which they will permit
themselves as a matter of conscience to disobey is to invite
chaos. No legal system could long survive if it gave every
individual the option of disregarding with impunity any law
which by his personal standard was judged morally unten-
able. Toleration of such conduct would not be democratic
... but [would be] inevitably anarchic.'49
137. See Moylan, 417 F.2d at 1007 n.13.
138. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
139. See id at 1116.
140. See Creagan, supra note 11, at 1112.
141. See Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1117.
142. See id.
143. See Creagan, supra note 11, at 1112.
144. See Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1117.
145. See id. (They were convicted for a violation of title 22, section 403 of the
District of Columbia Code.).
146. See id.
147. See id. at 1130.
148. Id. at 1133.
149. Id. at 1133-34 (quoting Judge Simon E. Sobeloff in United States v. Moy-
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Moreover, Judge Leventhal asserted that informing jurors of
their power of nullification would compel them to assume the duties
of a legislator or a judge." This task was too burdensome for a citi-
zen involuntarily assigned to jury duty.' Holding that the existence
of a juror's ability to nullify does not establish a rule that jurors must
be so informed by the judge, the court stated: "What makes for
health as an occasional medicine would be disastrous as a daily
diet."5 2 The court reasoned that an explicit instruction conveys ap-
proval, and when a jury feels so strongly about a case, it must use its
own initiative to act against the court's instructions, thereby limiting
the doctrine to only select cases.' "Since it is the essence of the ju-
dicial function to declare the applicable law, it follows that the mere
declaration of the law cannot be held outside the judicial function. " 4
As such, although Dougherty, like Sparf and Moylan, recognizes the
jury's power to nullify, it also refrains from giving jurors an express
right to do so.
The Eighth Circuit also rejected a proposed nullification in-
struction in United States v. Wiley."" In holding that the defendant
was not entitled to such an instruction, the court noted that since
1969, every federal court confronted with the issue of jury nullifica-
tion had rejected it.56
The defendant in United States v. Grismore"' requested that the
jury be instructed both that it could decide issues of law and fact, 8 as
well as ignore the court's instruction regarding the law. The trial
court rejected these requests. 9 Defendant appealed his conviction
on the grounds that he was denied a fair trial as a result of the trial
judge's failure to instruct on nullification.'o The Tenth Circuit dis-
lan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir. 1969)).
150. See id. at 1136.
151. See id.
152 Id.
153. See id. at 1136-37.
154. Id. at 1138.
155. 503 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1974). The proposed instruction included the fol-
lowing: "[T]he members of the jury have an inherent right to disregard the in-
structions of the court and the evidence presented and return a verdict of acquit-
tal if you find that the defendant was not blameworthy in the sense that he has
not shocked the community conscience ... ." Id. at 106-07.
156. Id. at 107.
157. 546 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1976).
158. See id. at 849.
159. See id
160. See id.
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posed of the issue with two sentences: "It is well-established that the
court instructs the jury as to the rules of law and that the jury applies
the facts as they find them to those rules.', 161 "A criminal defendant is
not, of course, entitled to have the jury instructed that they can disre-
gard the law."'62
Political, social, and therefore legal issues changed with the
times. For example, in 1973 the United States Supreme Court took
its first significant step towards legalizing abortion.'6 With that deci-
sion, a whole new political debate began. Hector Zevallos was a doc-
tor from Illinois who rendered medical services, including abortions,
to women.' 6 Don Anderson and two accomplices forced Zevallos
and his wife from their home at gunpoint and kept them in a remote
area for eight days."5 Mr. Anderson informed Zevallos that Ander-
son and his companions were members of the Army of God, an anti-
abortion group, and had abducted the couple because of the doctor's
connection with abortion clinics.'6 The kidnappers forced Zevallos
to tape a message to President Ronald Reagan calling for anti-
abortion legislation. 67 Anderson was charged with two counts of con-
spiracy and attempt to obstruct, delay, and affect interstate com-
merce through extortionate means.'" At trial, Anderson requested a
special jury instruction informing jurors of their power to nullify.
The court denied Anderson's request 16' and convicted him on both
counts.'70 On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Anderson asserted that
the trial court erred in refusing his proposed instruction. 7' Anderson
161. Id. (citing Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957); Sparf v.
United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895)).
162. Id. (citing United States v. Gorham, 523 F.2d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Wiley, 503 F.2d 106; United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (1972); United
States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
163. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
164. See United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446,447 (7th Cir. 1983).
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
16& See id. at 448. One of the clinics where Zevallos was employed purchased
products from supply companies out of state. Those items were then shipped to
the clinic in Illinois, thereby subjecting the transaction to regulation of interstate
commerce. See id.
169. See id. at 449.
170. See id. at 447.
171. The requested instruction read:
The jury has the power to decide, according to its own judgment and
conscience, all questions of law and fact involved in the issue of guilty or
not guilty.
Juries may apply matter [sic] of fact and law together, and form their
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maintained that the instruction was necessary to inform jurors of
their role as the community conscience in a case involving political
debate." Judge Harlington Wood, writing for the majority, empha-
sized the Dougherty opinion, which stated in part that
while the "community conscience" verdict is to be accepted
as a natural and at times desirable aberration under our sys-
tem, it is not to be positively sanctioned by instructions,
such as defendant's, which would encourage a jury to acquit
"under any circumstances" regardless of the applicable law
or proven facts.' 3
In refusing to reverse, the Seventh Circuit held that while nullifi-
cation may be worthwhile as a self-initiated exception to the norm, it
becomes something quite different and threatens the integrity of the
judicial system if formalized and added to the court's instructions.'
In other words, unreviewable, not-guilty Verdicts in cases where the
evidence clearly indicates guilt ensures satisfactory safeguards to the
jury's role as conscience of the community. 5 The Anderson court,
following the Dougherty and Simpson opinions, held that explicit in-
structions sanctioning jury nullification posed too great a threat to
the rule of law."7
Although it is apparent that federal courts were refusing to in-
struct criminal juries on nullification, United States v. Trujillo"77 pre-
sented the issue of whether defense counsel may encourage nullifica-
tion in closing arguments." Trujillo was convicted of three counts
relating to possession of and intent to distribute cocaine.7 9 On appeal
he alleged that the trial court erred by refusing to allow his attorney
to argue jury nullification during closing argument."s Specifically, de-
fense counsel wanted to argue that Trujillo was entitled to a not-
consideration of, and right judgment upon, both.
Jurors may not be punished for voting for acquittal under any cir-
cumstances.
Id. at 449.
172. See id.
173. Id. at 449-50 (quoting United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1137
(D.C. Cir. 1972)).
174. See id. at 450.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. 714 F.2d 102 (11th Cir. 1983).
17& See id. at 105.
179. See id. at 104.
180. See id. at 105.
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guilty verdict because he cooperated with the government."' The
court held that closing arguments must relate to the law as the jury
will be later instructed by the judge1 2 Further, although the jury has
the ability to return whatever verdict it deems appropriate, "neither
the court nor counsel should encourage jurors to violate their
oath."'3 As such, the Eleventh Circuit held that defense counsel may
not argue jury nullification to the jury during closing argument.'
84
The growth of anti-government groups has brought with it those
who assert exemption from federal tax statutes. One such case came
before the Ninth Circuit in 1991."85 Roy and Dixie Lee Powell were
convicted of willful failure to file tax returns for the years 1982, 1983,
and 1984."6 On appeal, the Powells asserted that the district court
had erred in refusing their requested jury nullification instruction."
The text of the proposed instruction included the following:
If you feel strongly about the values involved in this case, so
strongly that your conscience is aroused, then you may, as
the conscience for the community, disregard the strict re-
quirements of the law. You should disregard the law only if
the requirements of the law cannot justly be applied in this
case. By disregarding the law, you may use your common
sense judgment and find a verdict according to your con-
science."
Relying on Simpson as precedent, the Ninth Circuit held that de-
fendants were not entitled to the proposed instruction on nullifica-
tion."
In United States v. Sepulveda,'9° twelve defendants appealed their
convictions for various crimes arising out of a drug-trafficking opera-
tion. One of the many issues on appeal was whether a supplemental
trial court instruction to the jury was erroneous because it repudiated
jury nullification. During closing arguments, the defendants en-
dorsed the practice of jury nullification. Counsel for one of the de-
181. See id.
182. See id. at 106.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. United States v. Powell, 955 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1991).
186. See id. at 1208.
187. See id. at 1210.
188. Id. at 1213.
189. See id.
190. 15 F.3d 1161 (1st Cir. 1993).
191. See id. at 1190.
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fendants prodded the jury to investigate the doctrine.19 During de-
liberations, the jury asked the judge to "'[c]larify the law on jury nul-
lification."' 1 The trial court explained to the jury that federal judges
give the law which applies to the case and are prohibited from in-
structing on jury nullification.' In clarifying for the jury, the judge
stated that if the government proved the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt the jury should convict and if the government failed
to do so, the jury must acquit.195 It was this supplemental instruction
to which the defendants objected. The First Circuit followed previ-
ous federal cases holding that a judge may not instruct a jury on nul-
lification.196 It noted that while juries may sometimes "flex their
muscles,"1 and ignore law and evidence, neither the court nor coun-
sel should encourage such action.98 Judge Bruce M. Selya also held
that trial judges can prohibit counsel from advocating nullification to
juries and may disapprove jury nullification in instructing jurors on
their role in the decision-making process! 9
The current trend of mandatory sentencing schemes opened the
door to defendants seeking to inform juries of punishments.' While
excluding a specific nullification instruction, the district court in
United States v. Datcherl granted a defendant's motion to inform the
jury of the harsh punishment he faced if convicted. 2 In Datcher, the
defendant was charged with attempted distribution of a controlled
substance, conspiracy to distribute, and use or carrying of a firearm in
connection with the distribution.2 He faced a minimum prison term
of twenty-five years if convicted on all three counts.2 In his memo-
randum granting the motion to inform the jury, Judge Thomas A.
Wiseman Jr. looked at the function of the jury trial as necessary to
192 See id. at 1189.
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 1189-90.
196. See id. at 1190.
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See Sauer, supra note 102, at 1234.
201. 830 F. Supp. 411 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
202. See id. at 418.
203. See id. at 412.
204. See id. at 412 nn.2-3 (noting that the minimum term on the attempted dis-
tribution charge was ten years, plus an additional ten if convicted of the conspir-
acy and five more on the firearm count).
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prevent government oppression. The judge based this determina-
tion on precedent establishing the role of the jury as the "conscience
of the community." As such, the court reasoned that a jury has the
right to all relevant information to insure its proper function as pro-
tector against government oppression.' Judge Wiseman held that
awareness of sentencing allows the jury to approve or disapprove of
penalties, fulfilling its "oversight" purpose.' He further stressed that
while no outright nullification instruction would be given,2 the jury
could use the information on sentencing to nullify.21 In so holding,
the court affirmed that although it did not necessarily approve of
nullification with or without a court instruction, it accepted that there
are cases where redress is part of the jury's function.21  Datcher, ac-
cording to the court, was one of those cases.
When faced with a similar question regarding a jury instruction
on penalty, the United States Supreme Court held in opposition to
the Datcher opinion. The issue facing the Court in Shannon v. United
States2i 12 was whether a federal district court must instruct the jury
about the result of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
(NGI).213 In his majority opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas reviewed
the role of the jury and reiterated the well-established rule that while
the jury is the trier of fact, it is the judge's duty to impose a sen-
tence.2 4 The opinion noted that jurors are not informed regarding
minimum and maximum sentencing, probation, parole, and sentenc-
ing ranges for lesser included offenses.2 5 Justice Thomas further
noted that one of the reasons federal courts generally disapproved of
instructing the jury about the consequences of their verdict is that an
instruction on penalty would violate the principle that a jury is to
reach its verdict on the evidence, regardless of its possible conse-
quences.2 While the Court acknowledged that there was a potential
for an instruction similar to that proposed by the defendant in spe-
205. See id. at 414.
206. Id. (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,519 & n.15 (1968)).
207. See id. at 415.
208. Id. at 416.
209. See id. at 417-18.
210. See id at 41&
211. See id. at 417.
212. 512 U.S. 573.
213. See id. at 575.
214. See id. at 579.
215. See id. at 586-87.
216. See id. at 579 n.4. Justice Thomas did note, however, that in capital cases
juries may be given sentencing roles. See id.
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cific limited circumstances, the case before it was not such a circum-
stance.217 In holding that a federal district court is not required to in-
struct the jury regarding consequences of an NGI verdict,218 the
opinion explained that "providing jurors sentencing information in-
vites them to ponder matters that are not within their province, dis-
tracts them from their fact-finding responsibilities, and creates a
strong possibility of confusion.,
219
The Sixth Circuit expressly relied on Shannon and rejected
Datcher in United States v. Chesney.m In Chesney, the defendant ap-
pealed his conviction for possession of a firearm.2' On appeal, de-
fense counsel relied on Datcher, maintaining that the district court
erred in refusing to instruct the jury on punishment.m Following
Shannon, the Sixth Circuit held that well-settled precedent estab-
lished that the jury had no sentencing function in the defendant's
case, and therefore affirmed the conviction.m
To date, every federal circuit court of appeal considering the
question has denied the right to a specific instruction on jury nullifi-
cation and the right of defense counsel to directly argue for it. Al-
though one federal district court has allowed it, the United States
Supreme Court has prohibited attorneys from arguing for nullifica-
tion.TM Although jury nullification instructions or arguments are
prohibited in federal court, state courts are not bound by federal
precedent in this area. California practice, however, is consistent
with federal jury nullification perspective.'
B. California Case Law
The role of the jury in California was expressly set out in 1893 by
People v. Lem You.m The Supreme Court of California held that the
jury in a criminal trial has a right to determine the facts regarding a
217. See id. at 587-88. The opinion stated that such an instruction may be nec-
essary where a witness or prosecutor remarks in front of the jury that the defen-
dant would "go free" if found NGI. In a case of this type, the Court recognized
the need for a curative instruction. See id.
218. See id. at 575.
219. Id. at 579.
220. 86 F.3d 564,574 (6th Cir. 1996).
221. See id. at 567.
222. See id. at 574.
223. See id.
224. See Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
225. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
226. 97 Cal. 224,32 P. 11 (1893).
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defendant's guilt or innocence and apply those facts to the law given
to them by the court.m Distinguishing the court's role in the deci-
sion-making process, Justice Thomas B. McFarland explained that
the materiality of the evidence is a question of law which must be
decided by the court and not a factual determination for the jury. In
this opinion, the court also recognized the jury's "naked power to
decide all the questions arising on the general issue of not guilty. ' 'M
Over a half-century later, the same court acknowledged that often
"extralegal factors" are responsible for verdicts which are contrary to
the evidence in a case.229 The court noted that triers of fact exercise
this power to reduce harsh legal punishment or to show mercy.m It
commented further on the awesome character of a jury's state consti-
tutional power and noted that jury convictions can be set aside only
for a miscarriage of justice.2l
The California decision cited most often by nullification advo-
cates is Justice Otto Kaus's concurring opinion in People v. Dillon. 2
The defendant in Dillon was a seventeen-year-old minor charged
with first degree murder and attempted robbery.2i The defendant
was convicted of both counts.' The first degree murder conviction
was based upon the California felony-murder rule.2s At trial a clini-
cal psychologist was called as an expert witness. The psychologist
testified that after conducting a number of tests and examinations, he
227. See id. at 228, 32 P. at 12.
228. Id. (emphasis omitted).
229. People v. Powell, 34 Cal. 2d 196,205,208 P.2d 974, 980 (1949).
230. See id. at 207, 208 P.2d at 981.
231. See id. at 206, 208 P.2d at 980. Today's California Constitution lays out
the rule:
No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on
the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or
rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or
for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination
of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the
opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of
justice.
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 13.
232. 34 Cal. 3d 441,668 P.2d 697, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1983).
233. See id. at 450-51, 668 P.2d at 700, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
234. See id. at 450, 688 P.2d at 700, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
235. Felony-murder is described in California Jury Instruction number 8.21,
which was included as part of the jury instructions at trial. It states in pertinent
part: "The unlawful killing of a human being, whether intentional, unintentional
or accidental, which occurs [during the commission or attempted commission of
the crime] ... is murder of the first degree when the perpetrator had the specific
intent to commit that crime." CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCrIONS, CRIMINAL No.
8.21 (6th ed. 1996) [hereinafter CALrIc].
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determined that the defendant was intellectually, socially, and emo-
tionally immature, and that the defendant lived in a "world of make-
believe."'' 6 During deliberations, the jury sent two notes to the judge.
The first asked about the doctor's testimony regarding the fact that
the defendant was being tried as an adult. It further clarified that
"'[f]rom his testimony, it appears that Norman's [i.e., defendant's]
mentality and emotional maturity is that of a minor. ' ' 7 The trial
judge responded by telling the jury not to theorize as to why the de-
fendant was being tried as an adult. 8 Later, a second note asked the
judge whether a second degree murder or manslaughter verdict could
be rendered if it was determined that death occurred in the course of
the attempted robbery. 9 The court answered that if the jury found
that the killing occurred during a robbery, then it would be first de-
gree murder. ° After announcing the guilty verdict for first degree
murder and before discharging the jury, the judge expressed sympa-
thy toward the jurors, explaining that he understood their reluctance
to apply the felony-murder rule to the facts presented in this case.2 '
Two days later the jury foreman wrote a letter to the judge regarding
the jury's unwillingness to return a verdict according to the felony-
murder rule. The letter stated in pertinent part:
It was extremely difficult for most of the members, includ-
ing myself, not to allow compassion and sympathy to influ-
ence our verdict as Norman Dillon by moral standards is a
minor ....
The felony-murder law is extremely harsh but with the evi-
dence and keeping 'the law, the law', we the jury had little
choice but to bring in a verdict of guilty of 1st degree
236. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 483, 668 P.2d at 723, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
237. Id., 668 P.2d at 723, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17.
238. See id., 668 P.2d at 723, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
239. See id. at 484, 668 P.2d at 724, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
240. See id.
241. The judge's comments included the following:
I don't want to say a lot about the verdict at this point, but I can tell
outhat based upon the evidence, your decision is certainly supported
y the evidence. This felony murder rule is a very harsh rule and it op-
erated very harshly in this case. I felt that the evidence did not support a
first degree murder conviction under any theory other than felony first
degree murder, and the law is the law.
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murder.2
Based upon these facts, Justice Kaus, in a concurring opinion, as-
serted that the trial court's instructions "caused an unwilling jury to
return a verdict of first degree murder."2 43 He reasoned that the in-
struction should have informed' the jury of its right to return a verdict
more lenient than the facts dictated and should have mentioned that
jurors could not be punished for doing this.2" He maintained that
these elements were the "essence of the jury's power to 'nullify.' '2 45
Despite the previous assertions, Justice Kaus's concurrence did
not support an outright nullification instruction. "To instruct on nul-
lification at the outset of deliberations affirmatively invites the jury
to consider disregarding the law. I... do not advocate it."246 Accord-
ing to Justice Kaus, the jury in Dillon essentially asked, "'May we
nullify?"' 247 At this point he supports informing the jury of nullifica-
tion.248 While Justice Kaus supports the view that the court need not
push the jury in the direction of nullification, he also noted that the
court is not permitted to pressure the jury "into stifling a spontane-
ous urge to nullify."249
In the plurality opinion, Justice Stanley Mosk responded to the
nullification scheme set forth in Justice Kaus's concurrence. He
stated that Justice Kaus's opinion "impliedly reopen[ed] the classic
debate as to whether society has created courts of law or courts of
justice. '" Incredulous, Justice Mosk stated that despite the results of
such debate, "it cannot seriously be urged that, when asked by the ju-
rors, a trial judge must advise them: 'I have instructed you on the law
applicable to this case. Follow it or ignore it, as you choose."' 1 Jus-
tice Mosk's opinion holds that, although nullification may provide
sensible fairness in extraordinary cases, "the more likely result is an-
archy."
' '
In a concurring opinion, Justice Pro Tem Robert Kingsley de-
242. Id. at 484-85, 668 P.2d at 724, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 417 (emphasis added).
243. Id. at 490,668 P.2d at 728, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 421.
244. See id. at 490-91 & n.2, 668 P.2d at 728 & n.2, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 421 & n.2
(Kaus, J., concurring).
245. Id. at 490, 668 P.2d at 728, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 421 (Kaus, J., concurring).
246. Id. at 491, 668 P.2d at 729, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 422 (Kaus, J., concurring).
247. Id. at 492, 668 P.2d at 729, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 422 (Kaus, J., concurring).
248. See id. at 491-92, 668 P.2d at 729, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 422 (Kaus, J., concur-
ring).
249. Id. at 493, 668 P.2d at 730, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 423 (Kaus, J., concurring).
250. Id. at 488 n.39, 668 P.2d at 726 n.39, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 419 n.39.
251. Id., 668 P.2d at 726 n.39, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 419-20 n.39.
252 Id.
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fined jury nullification as a concept allowing jurors to "ignore the
plain letter of the law" and execute whatever justice they deem so-
cially appropriate.' He relied on Dean Pound's interpretation of
nullification as a "soft spot" allowing "the law to yield in a special
case rather than cast doubt on the justice of the applicable law in
general."'
Although the issue of jury nullification was not directly ad-
dressed by the California Supreme Court in Ballard v. Uribe, Chief
Justice Bird and Justice Mosk recognized the problems associated
with jury nullification and expressed their differing views in separate
opinions. 5 The underlying litigation concerned a personal injury in
which the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. 6 Both parties ap-
pealed, and the plaintiff moved for a new trial based upon alleged ju-
ror misconduct.' On appeal, plaintiff provided declarations of four
jury members asserting that two other jurors had stated they would
not award money for pain and suffering regardless of the law's re-
quirements. 8
In his concurring opinion, Justice Mosk maintained that the
plaintiff's appeal should be dismissed as a matter of principle.2 Ac-
cording to Mosk, finality of judgment is threatened when appeals of
this type are given credit.m° He asserted that "Ij]ustice is not served
by tiresome replays of jury deliberations." 1 While acknowledging
the existence of nullification in some cases,262 he also expressed his
253. Id. at 493,668 P.2d at 730, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 423 (Kingsley, J., concurring).
254. Id.
255. See Ballard v. Uribe, 41 Cal. 3d 564, 715 P.2d 624, 224 Cal. Rptr. 664
(1986). In his plurality opinion, Justice Joseph Grodin did not address the ques-
tion of jury nullification. See id. at 568-75, 715 P.2d at 625-30, 224 Cal. Rptr. at
666-70. Justice Malcolm Lucas did not address the question in his concurrence.
See id. at 578, 715 P.2d at 632, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 672 (Lucas, J., concurring).
However, both Justice Stanley Mosk and Chief Justice Rose Bird addressed the
issue and concluded with differing views. See id. at 575-600, 715 P.2d at 630-48,
224 Cal. Rptr. at 670-88 (Mosk, J., concurring, Bird, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
256. See id. at 568, 715 P.2d at 625, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
257. See id. at 574,715 P.2d at 629,224 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
258. See id. at 590-91, 715 P.2d at 641, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 681 (Bird, C.J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
259. See id. at 575,715 P.2d at 630,224 Cal. Rptr. at 670 (Mosk, J., concurring).
260. See id.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 576-77, 715 P.2d at 631, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 672 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring).
I am confident it is not uncommon for a juror or jurors to express ill-
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belief that "[it would be a grave disservice to the integrity of the jury
system and to the finality of judgments if we were to encourage
probing into the subjective reasons behind the unanimous verdict.... 0
Justice Mosk also feared an end to jury secrecy; in recognizing that
nullification may occur, he maintained that what happens in the jury
room should stay there and not be subject to appellate review."
On the other hand, while recognizing that nullification occurs in
criminal cases-though unsanctioned and without instruction from
the court-Chief Justice Bird contended that jury nullification has no
place in a civil context.u5 In her opinion-part concurring, part dis-
senting-the Chief Justice distinguished nullification in criminal cases
from nullification in civil cases.m She noted that while the jury has
no right to do so, it asserts the "naked power to return a verdict of
'not guilty' even where acquittal is inconsistent with the law given by
the court."267 This power of juries, she maintains, is fitting in the
criminal arena due to the very nature of criminal proceedings, with
the existence of general verdicts and double jeopardy. Because
criminal juries only return general verdicts and because double jeop-
ardy bars appellate courts from reversing a jury's findings, courts in
criminal actions have little power to stop jurors from nullifying.2"
Chief Justice Rose Bird stated that in civil cases, however, jury nulli-
fication is inconsistent with special verdicts because it contradicts the
trial court's ability to order such verdicts. Additionally, it precludes
courts from ordering a new trial as a result of juror misconduct, de-
spite long-standing precedent.u9 To support her position, the Chief
Justice quoted Abraham Lincoln:
"[L]et me not be understood as saying there are no bad
laws, or that grievances may not arise for the redress of
considered disagreement with the law recited by the judge. Indeed, Jus-
tice Kaus, in his separate opinion in People v. Dillon, argued for recog-
nition of what he described as the "power of a jury to nullify what it
considers an unjust law."
Id. (citations omitted).
263. Id. at 577,715 P.2d at 632,224 Cal. Rptr. at 672 (Mosk, J., concurring).
264. See id. at 577-78, 715 P.2d at 632, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 672 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring).
265. See id. at 599-600, 715 P.2d at 647, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 687-88 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
266. See id.
267. Id., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 687 (Bird, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390,393-94 (1932)).
268. See id. at 599-600, 715 P.2d at 647-48, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 687-88 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
269. See id. at 600,715 P.2d at 648,224 Cal. Rptr. at 688 (Bird, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
[Vol. 31:1
JURY NULLIFICATION
which no legal provisions have been made. I mean to say no
such thing. But I do mean to say that although bad laws, if
they exist, should be repealed as soon as possible, still, while
they continue in force, for the sake of example, they should
be religiously observed." ' 0
The California Court of Appeal confronted Justice Kaus's Dillon
opinion head on in 1986Y The facts were similar to those in Dillon:
Johnny Partner was convicted of "first degree murder, robbery, and
of the special circumstances that the murder was committed during
the commission of robbery," thereby invoking the felony-murder
rule.m During deliberations, the jury asked the trial judge whether
they could find guilt on robbery and second degree murder. 3 The
judge explained to the jurors that they could reach such a verdict if
the killing did not result from the robbery.2 4 On appeal, the defen-
dant relied on Justice Kaus's concurrence in Dillon and asserted that
the court should have assumed that the jury's question was an at-
tempt to avoid imposing the felony-murder rule therefore entitling
them to receive a nullification instruction2 5 The Court of Appeal
pointed out that the cited opinion was expressly rejected by the lead
opinion of the same case.2" The court explained that, faced with the
same issue, other courts had routinely held that while a jury may ex-
ercise such a power, the power should not be "legitimized" with a
jury instruction2m In expressing its opinion that the jury should not
be instructed that it may disregard the law, the Court of Appeal
quoted Dougherty: "An explicit instruction to a jury conveys an
implied approval that runs the risk of degrading the legal structure
requisite for true freedom, for an ordered liberty that protects against
anarchy as well as tyranny." 8 As in previous California cases, the
270. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Abra-
ham Lincoln, Address at the Young Men's Lyceum, Springfield, IlL (Jan. 27,
1837), in 1 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 44 (John G. Nicolay
& John Hay eds., 1905)).
271. See People v. Partner, 180 Cal. App. 3d 178, 185-86, 225 Cal. Rptr. 502,
506 (1986).
272. Ik at 181, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
273. See id. at 185, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. See id. at 185-86, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
277. Id. at 186, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
278. Id. (quoting United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1137 (D.C. Cir.
1972)).
November 1997]
30 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
power of the jury to nullify was recognized, though the right to do so
was not.29
A little more than three weeks after its decision in Partner, the
California Court of Appeal considered another first degree felony-
murder conviction. At trial, the defendant's request for jury in-
structions on lesser included offenses was denied. 1 On appeal, the
defendant argued that Justice Kaus's Dillon concurrence regarding
jury nullification required that the jury in a felony-murder case "be
permitted to determine the degree of the defendant's guilt."2 2 The
defendant further argued that the other justices in Dillon impliedly
adopted Justice Kaus's nullification opinion m Rejecting the nullifi-
cation contention once again, the court affirmed the defendant's
conviction.24
A new spin on the nullification question is whether the trial
court's refusal to give an instruction on jury nullification violates the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. This was the issue
on appeal in People v. Fernandez.' In this case, defendant Fer-
nandez was charged with felony false imprisonment by violence and
battery with serious bodily injury. ' In the middle of deliberations,
the jury sent a note to the trial judge asking whether it could return a
guilty verdict to the lesser crime of "assault" instead of "[b]attery
with serious bodily injury.'" ' The basis for the confusion was that al-
though the jurors apparently agreed upon the battery charge, they
did not feel the victim's injuries were "serious." M The court an-
swered the jury's question simply: "[N]o."' 9 On appeal, defendant
alleged that by informing the jury that it could not convict on the
lesser offense, the court compelled a guilty verdict on the battery
charge29 and thereby violated his Sixth Amendment rights.291 At the
outset of its opinion, the court stressed that no modem court has held
279. See id. (citing People v. Powell, 34 Cal. 2d 196, 205 n.2, 208 P.2d 974, 980
n.2 (1949)).
280. See People v. Williams, 180 Cal. App. 3d 922,225 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1986).
281. See id. at 924, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
282. Id. at 925, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
283. See id.
284. See id. at 927, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
285. 26 Cal. App. 4th 710,31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (1994).
286. See id. at 712, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 678.
287. Id. at 713, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 678-79.
288. Id.
289. Id., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 679.
290. See id. at 713-14,31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 679.
291. See id.
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that a judge must instruct jurors that they may disregard the law.'
The appellate court recognized that "[a] jury has the 'undisputed
power' to acquit," even where its verdict conflicts with the evidence
and law as given by the court.20
Moreover, the majority opinion noted that modem nullification,
unlike its historical counterpart in which the jury decided both fact
and law, is based upon "the juror's conscience rather than a different
view of the law." 294 Agreeing with precedent that a juror's duty in-
cludes the obligation to follow the law, the court stressed that not re-
quiring this duty "is akin to telling all drivers to drive as fast as they
think appropriate without posting a limit as a point of departure. It
risks, if not chaos, at least caprice." 295 The court affirmed the modem
jury's duty by reasoning that jurors have redress through their elected
representatives for laws they believe are too strict or unfair.296 Based
on this reasoning, the appellate court held that the trial judge did not
err in refusing to tell the jury it could return a verdict of guilty on the
lesser offense when it had unanimously concluded that the defendant
was not guilty of the greater.27 "Such a response would have been
tantamount to telling the jurors to let their emotions govern their
decision and to disregard the law." '
Punishment prescribed by California's "three strikes" law was at
issue in a 1996 case, People v. Baca.2 9 Defendant Baca was convicted
in a three strikes case.' On appeal, Baca argued that the trial judge
should have allowed the jury to consider the harshness of the poten-
tial punishment in his case as a basis for acquittal.3' The appellate
court noted that the judge did inform the jurors, at the beginning of
the case, that it was a third-strike prosecution.m Furthermore, in
closing argument, defense counsel stressed that the case was "'about
292. See id. at 714, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 679.
293. Id. (citing United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1969)).
294. Id. (citing George C. Christie, Lawful Departures from Legal Rules:
"Jury Nullification" and Legitimated Disobedience, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1289, 1299
(1974)).
295. Fernandez, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 715, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 680.
296. See id.
297. See id. at 715-16, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 680; CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West
1997).
298. Fernandez, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 716, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 680.
299. 48 Cal. App. 4th 1703,56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445 (1996).
300. See id. at 1705, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446.
301. See id. at 1705-06, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447.
302 See id. at 1706, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447.
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as serious as it gets in a courtroom .... [A]ny case that involves
those kinds of consequences deserves or warrants pretty careful con-
scientious consideration and deliberation."'" In its opinion, the ap-
peals court recognized the jury's "undisputed power" to acquit but
also noted that the jury should not be informed of that power, "much
less invited to use it."' The court held that since no California court
had adopted jury nullification, it would not either.'
In summary, California case law does recognize the jury's ability,
or "naked power," to nullify. Nevertheless, no formal instruction
from the court or argument by counsel inviting jury nullification is
permitted. Despite this restriction, jury nullification takes place
suprisingly often.
V. RECENT NEWSMAKING CASES
Although jury nullification has existed in the United States since
the pre-Revolutionary War era, jurors have used it frequently in re-
cent history. Commentators proffer explanations for what seems to
be a wave of nullification over the past two decades. It may be that
in today's less formal setting, jurors feel less intimidated by the
authority of the court than in the past. Or, given recent enactments
of three-strikes laws and mandatory sentencing schemes, jurors may
believe that laws are unjust or that penalties are excessive.3" Some
believe that the courtroom provides a forum to address social prob-
lems.w Racial tensions that exist in society do not disappear when
citizens take an oath and become jurors on a case. Possibly the
American public has softened, accepting excuses and justifications
that the law does not. Whatever the reasons, jurors are taking the
law into their own hands more frequently.
In 1979 a jury tried Dan White for the murders of San Francisco
Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk." White faced
two counts of first degree murder and a possible death penalty sen-
tence if convicted." White presented a diminished capacity defense,
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1707,56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448.
305. See id. at 1708, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448.
306. See Gail Diane Cox, Jurors Rise Up Over Principle and Their Perks,
NAT'L L.J., May 29, 1995, at Al.
307. See Weinberg-Brodt, supra note 39, at 849.
308. See Francis J. Moriarty, White Is Convicted of Voluntary Manslaughter,
WASH. POST, May 22, 1979, at Al.
309. See Francis J. Moriarty, Defense Says White "Unable to Cope," WASH.
POST, May 2, 1979, at A16.
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asserting that junk food was one of the influences that deprived him
of the capacity to act with malice?"1 The jury accepted what has since
been euphemistically referred to as "the Twinkie defense.01 ' Dan
White was convicted of two counts of voluntary manslaughter and
sentenced to the maximum term of seven years and eight months in
state prison.313
Twenty members of the Lucchese crime family of La Cosa Nos-
tra were prosecuted on federal racketeering charges."4 The trial
lasted two years, including five months of jury selection and a year
and a half of testimony.3 There were eighty-nine witnesses, eight
hundred and fifty exhibits, and a transcript of over forty-one thou-
sand pages.316 Nevertheless, after less than two days of deliberations,
the jury acquitted all twenty defendants on each of the seventy-seven
counts.3 7 It was reported that confusion existed regarding the judge's
instructions. Judge Harold Ackerman, trial judge on the case, ex-
pressed that "[t]oo much was charged against too many, which took
too long and resulted in jury nullification." '318
In 1990 District of Columbia Mayor Marion Barry was "charged
with one count of conspiracy to possess cocaine, ten counts of pos-
session of cocaine, and three counts of perjury for allegedly lying to
the grand jury that had investigated him."319 Barry, caught on video-
tape smoking crack cocaine, was acquitted on one felony charge; the
jury hung on all other felony counts.32° However, Barry was also
convicted of one misdemeanor count of possession.321 United States
District Court Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson, who presided over
the trial, later told an audience of Harvard law students that the evi-
310. See Maura Dolan, Why Jurors Err: They're Just Human, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 1994, at Al.
311. Id.
312. See Francis J. Moriarty, Maximum Term Imposed in San Francisco Kill-
ings, WASH. POST, July 4, 1979, at A3.
313. See id.
314. See Otto G. Obermaier, The Lawyer's Bookshelf, N.Y. L.J. June 23, 1995,
at 2 (book review).
315. See id.
316. See id.
317. See id.
318. Id.
319. Butler, supra note 20, at 682.
320. See Jeanne Dewey & Brian Blomquist, 5 Years Later, A Very Different
Barry, Personal, Public Changes Since Conviction, WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 10, 1995,
at C4.
321. See id.
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dence conclusively proved that Barry was guilty of at least eleven of
the thirteen counts charged22 The judge complained that the jury ig-
nored overwhelming evidence of guilt and engaged in "anarchy.
' 3n
In 1991 a Manhattan jury acquitted El-Sayyid Nosair of killing
Meir Kahane, founder of the Jewish Defense League 2.3 ' The trial
judge declared that the jury's verdict was "against the overwhelming
weight of the evidence and devoid of common sense and logic.
'3u
One year later, a jury acquitted Lemrick Nelson, Jr. of the stab-
bing death of Yankel Rosenbaum during a violent encounter be-
tween blacks and Hasidic Jews in Crown Heights, Brooklyn.3 ' Be-
fore his death, Rosenbaum had identified Nelson as his attacker?2a
Nelson was arrested with a bloody knife in his pocket and confessed
to killing Rosenbaum, although he later recanted." Nelson accom-
panied jurors to a dinner celebrating his acquittal. 29
Despite admitting to cutting off her husband's penis, Lorena
Bobbitt was found not guilty by reason of insanity for the malicious
wounding of John Bobbitt.33' Despite significant evidence to the con-
trary, John Bobbitt was also acquitted in his criminal trial on charges
of marital sexual assault of Lorena 31
A jury in Ventura County, California, failed to convict four Los
Angeles police officers for the beating of Rodney King, all of which
was caught on videotape.3 32 An attorney for the defense argued to the
jury that only a "thin blue line" of police officers will risk their lives
322. See Cox, supra note 306, at Al.
323. Frank J. Murray, Race, Distrust of Cops Color Black-Jury Verdicts,
WASH. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at Al (quoting Judge Jackson's speech at Harvard
University).
324. U.S. v. Nosair, 854 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
325. David Johnston, Reno Sees Growing Evidence and Makes Call, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 26, 1993, at B4.
326. See Jan Hoffnan, Learning from a Loss: Federal Prosecutors Win a
Guilty Verdict by Avoiding Mistakes Made in First Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
1997, at Al.
327. See icL Nelson was convicted of violating Rosenbaum's federal civil rights
on February 10, 1997, in federal court. See id.
32& See id.
329. See id.
330. See Dennis Duggan, For Lorena, Verdict's as Good as It Will Get,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 22, 1994, at A4.
331. See Sean Piccoli, Now It's Bobbitt's Chance to Tell the Media His Story,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1993, at C3.
332 See Marvin Zalman & Maurisa Gates, Rethinking Venue in Light of the
"Rodney King" Case: An Interest Analysis, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 215, 215-16
(1993).
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to keep law abiding citizens safe from the "criminal element."333 He
went on to explain to jurors that a "certain amount of force is inevi-
table in maintaining law and order."'
The King verdicts resulted in the worst race riot in American his-
tory and the brutal beating of Reginald Denny.335 Regardless of the
fact that Denny's beating-like King's before-was videotaped, a Los
Angeles jury acquitted Damian Williams and Henry Watson of the
most serious charges against them: willful, deliberate, premeditated
attempted murder.336 Williams was convicted on one felony count of
simple mayhem and for misdemeanor assault charges.33 Watson was
found guilty on a misdemeanor assault charge.38 Had they been
convicted of the attempted murder charges, both would have faced
life in prison.339
Members of the Branch Davidian cult were prosecuted for mur-
der in connection with the FBI raid on their Waco, Texas com-
pound.? Before the trial in February 1994, jury nullification propo-
nents distributed fifty thousand pamphlets outside the courthouse."1
The pamphlets informed potential jurors that they could acquit with-
out fear of punishment. 2 All eleven defendants were acquitted?
The Menendez brothers riddled their parents with eleven bullets
and went on a million-dollar spending spree.3 The first two juries in
the case were unable to reach a verdict. 5 These juries, hearing the
brothers' essentially uncorroborated claims of sexual abuse and death
threats if they made the abuse public, could not decide whether they
333. Tony Perry, Snubbing the Law to Vote on Conscience, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5,
1995, at A5.
334. Id.
335. See Amy Wallace & John Hurst, "Let's Get on with Life," Denny Says
After Jury Verdicts, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1993, at Al.
336. See Edward J. Boyer & John L. Mitchell, Attempted Murder Acquittal,
Deadlock Wind Up Denny Trial, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1993, at Al.
337. See id.
338. See Wallace & Hurst, supra note 335, at Al.
339. See id.
340. See Reynolds Holding, Group Tries to Sway Jurors, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 11,
1995, at Bi.
341. See Perry, supra note 333, at AS.
342. See id.
343. See Holding, supra note 340, at Bi.
344. See Ann W. O'Neil, Menendezes Are Found Guilty of Killing Parents,
L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 21, 1996, at Al.
345. See id.
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murdered their parents.' Was it nullification based on sympathy, or
was there a failure of proof in the minds of the jurors? That debate
will continue. Commentators have asserted that the reason Dr. Jack
Kevorkian was acquitted in his assisted suicide prosecutions in 1996
was that the jurors decided to follow their instincts instead of the
law? 7
California judges are seeing a backlash to three strikes cases
where, despite sufficient evidence establishing guilt, jurors refuse to
convict because of mandatory twenty-five year to life prison terms.ms
When Johnnie Cochran urged jurors during his closing argument
in the O.J. Simpson trial ' to "send a message"' to the Los Angeles
Police Department, they complied. The jurors deliberated for just
over three hours, following nine months of testimony before return-
ing verdicts of not guilty.35' The debate continues as to whether
Simpson's acquittal resulted from jury nullification or the jurors' view
that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof.
This is only a sample of the cases that have attracted media at-
tention. There are less widely known cases where nullification has
occurred. Although most courts do not instruct on nullification, ad-
vocates are becoming more assertive in their efforts to inform the
general public of the concept of jury nullification, and advocate that
jurors nullify when they feel it is appropriate.
VI. NULLIFICATION ADVOCATES
A. A "Fully Informed Jury Act"
Among the groups attracted to the jury nullification theory,
many make "strange bedfellows. ''52 Members of the National Rifle
Association, gun control advocates, abortion rights supporters, pro-
life groups, those who support legalizing marijuana, and militia
346. See id.
347. See Eugene Kane, Jury Nullification Fails at Being Colorblind,
MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, Apr. 9, 1996, at 1.
348. See Cox, supra note 306, at Al.
349. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 1995 WL 697928 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1995).
350. Id. at *10.
351. Sheryl Stolberg, Will We Ever Get Along?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1995, at
83 (The Simpson Legacy, Special Report).
352. CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER, MY SUMMER IN A GARDEN (1870), re-
printed in BARTLETr'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 603 (Emily Morison Beck ed.,
1980).
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groups support a "Fully Informed Jury Act."3"' The proposal, if en-
acted, would require judges to instruct jurors that they can determine
both facts and law.3" The proposed legislation is backed by the Fully
Informed Jury Association (FIJA), an organization which supports
the idea that jurors have a right to vote their conscience." The group
contends that jurors can choose to acquit defendants in spite of evi-
dence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, if they conclude that it is
the right thing to do.356
FIJA alleges three results that will occur if the act becomes law.
First, unjustly accused defendants will be satisfied that the "system
actually delivers justice.''357 Second, "[1]egislators will have access to
regular feedback from ordinary people" so they can better represent
their constituents.3 " Third, "[w]hen the laws of the land respect the
will of the people, as revealed by their jury verdicts, the people, in
turn, will show more respect for the law.
359
FIJA was founded in Helmville, Montana, in 1989. The group's
founders say that their purpose for forming the group was to control
an out-of-control government3 6 The group, which advocates telling
jurors that they have the power to judge the law and the facts of any
case, claims to have three thousand members nationwide, with one
thousand in California and three hundred in San Diego County.36" '
The organization's literature states that if jurors were only supposed
to determine the facts, a computer would suffice in their place.362
FIJA argues that nullification is best applied in victimless crimes such
as gambling, prostitution, and drug possession.6
The five presiding judges of the San Diego Municipal Courts
signed a general court order against the local FIJA Coordinator and
353. See Korroch & Davidson, supra note 10, at 139-40 (citing Stephen J.
Adler, Courtroom Putsch? Jurors Should Reject Laws They Don't Like, Activist
Group Argues, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1991, at Al).
354. See Fully Informed Jury Association, True or False? When You Sit on a
Jury, You Have the Right to Vote Your Conscience [hereinafter FIJA Pamphlet].
355. See id.
356. See Leslie Wolf, Can Jury Void Law? Proponent Faces Jail, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRm., Dec. 6, 1993, at B1.
357. FIJA Pamphlet, supra note 354.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. See Perry, supra note 333, at A5.
361. See Wolf, supra note 356, at B1.
362- See FIJA Pamphlet, supra note 354.
363. See id.
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FIJA .' The order prohibits FIJA members from distributing their
literature within 150 feet of San Diego County courthouses.6 The
judges claim that FIJA interferes with the jury system and the ad-
ministration of justice by passing out information urging jurors to
violate their oaths."' FIJA filed for injunctive relief in federal district
court alleging that the order was unconstitutional. When the district
court held that the order did not violate the group's First Amend-
ment rights, FIJA appealed.367 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding
that even if the order constituted a "content-based restriction on po-
litical speech in a public forum.... the regulation [was] necessary to
serve the state's compelling interest in protecting the integrity of the
jury system and [was] narrowly drawn to achieve that end."3
San Diego Municipal Judge, Harley J. Earwicker, said, "I've
taken an oath to uphold the law, to uphold the Constitution and all
the laws written by the Legislature, whether or not I agree with
them."369 Judges warn jurors that they have sworn to uphold the law
and that nullification is a violation of this oath."
FIJA's assertions of the act's benefits are unreasonable. To be-
lieve that the unjustly accused are better served by nullification is
naive and misguided. The American justice system is designed to
protect the innocent. Jurors bring their own life experiences and bi-
ases with them to the jury panel7 1 Instructing jurors to ignore the
law and "vote their conscience" allows them to use bias in the deci-
sion-making process, leading to potentially guilty verdicts in cases of
innocent defendants. While the current system may allow some of
the same, the requirement that jurors take the law from the judge
eliminates the total discretion of the jury and safeguards the wrongly
364. See Fully Informed Jury Ass'n v. County of San Diego, 78 F.3d 593, 593
(9th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 63 (1996).
365. The general order prohibited:
[t]he distribution or attempted distribution of any written materials
tending to influence, interfere or impede the lawful discharge of the du-
ties of a trial juror, and communication or attempt so to communicate
with any person summoned, drawn, or serving as a trial juror in these
courts for purposes of so influencing, interfering, or impeding the lawful
discharge of the duties of a trial juror in or within 50 yards of any public
entrance to the facilities within which Courts conduct jury trials Within
this County.
Id.
366. See Wolf, supra note 356, at B1.
367. See Fully Informed Jury Ass'n, 78 F.3d at 593.
368. Id.
369. Wolf, supra note 356, at B1.
370. See Perry, supra note 333, at A5.
371. See id.
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accused. Nullification removes this safeguard.
The belief that nullification allows legislators to better represent
the people is false. If the act FIJA proposes is enacted, laws would
change daily depending on the twelve people in the jury box for a
particular day. Currently, legislators have access to information from
a broad base of constituents via letters, telegrams, phone calls, pro-
tests, and the media. Nullification merely provides legislators the
feedback of twelve people on a given day. This is not democracy; it is
anarchy.
A founder of FIJA contends that jury nullification should apply
only in cases of victimless crime.m However, his goal is impossible to
accomplish. Once jurors are given unbridled discretion, it becomes
impractical to draw the line between "justified" and "unjustified"
nullification. Jury nullification permits jurors to ignore the law, al-
lowing no guarantee of which guilty defendants will go unpunished.
The California FIJA coordinator believes that "rights come di-
rectly from God, they don't come from the Constitution... God cre-
ated man and man created government, and it's clear that God's law
is the supreme law., 3 3 The Coordinator further believes that laws
come from God and the church7 4 Even if this were true, not all ju-
rors believe in the same god or church. Legitimizing jury nullification
by permitting an instruction on it does not provide a necessarily con-
sistent application of the law in a religiously pluralistic society.
B. Nullification Based Upon Race
Paul Butler, associate professor of law at George Washington
University Law School, advocates that African-American jurors nul-
lify the law and acquit black defendants who are clearly guilty of
nonviolent crimes.37 According to Professor Butler, jury nullification
may be the only way blacks can escape "[t]he tyranny of the major-
ity."' 6 Butler's contention is that the "black community is better off
when some nonviolent lawbreakers remain in the community rather
than go to prison.'"r He offers nullification as a way for black people
372 See Wolf, supra note 356, at B1.
373. Id.
374. See id.
375. See Butler, supra note 20, at 715.
376. Id. at 709-10 n.179 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 7 (Currin
V. Shields ed., Liberal Arts Press 1956)).
377. Id. at 679.
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to combat racism. While Butler does acknowledge that nullification
was used in the South to the disadvantage of black defendants, he
counters that nullification in approved cases is permissible.78 He ar-
gues that Southern jurors "erred in their calculus of justice;" '379 how-
ever, he sets forth no proposal as to how defendants will be protected
from such errors in the future. Butler further asserts that it is a
"moral responsibility of black jurors to emancipate some guilty black
outlaws."3  While Butler is not proposing a jury instruction on nulli-
fication, his goal is to inform African-American jurors of their power
to nullify. Professor Butler's argument raises questions about crime
and punishment that reach well beyond the scope of jury nullifica-
tion.
C. Nullification as a Constitutional Right
Alan Scheflin, associate professor of law at Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center,38 believes that jury nullification is essential to re-
storing public faith in the courts and making laws accountable to the
people they serve." Like Butler, however, Scheflin does not advo-
cate a jury instruction regarding nullification." Scheflin acknowl-
edges the day-to-day legal changes that would occur if juries were
permitted to determine laws.'" Nevertheless, he bases his support of
nullification on a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.8
Scheflin states that the Sixth Amendment includes "a right of the
defendant to be given the chance to be acquitted, even though such
acquittal conflicts with both the facts and the judge's instructions on
the law."3 6 He asserts that the jury should be told about the full ac-
quittal rights of the defendant.3 Hence, although there is no "right"
to a jury nullification instruction, in most cases, informing the jury of
such an acquittal right would be equivalent to an outright nullifica-
tion instruction.
In addition to the alleged Sixth Amendment basis, the right to a
37& See id. at 705.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 679.
381. See Scheflin, supra note 20, at 168.
382. See id. at 224-25.
383. See Wolf, supra note 356, at B1.
384. See id.
385. See Alan Scheflin & John Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of
Controversy, 43 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 51, 55 (1980).
386. Scheflin, supra note 20, at 219.
387. See id.
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nullification instruction has also been presented on equal protection
grounds 3 s Proponents argue that defendants will benefit or suffer
randomly, depending on whether or not the jury is aware of its power
to nullify.
389
The many arguments in support of jury nullification, both consti-
tutional and non-constitutional, run the risk of creating a system
where anything goes. As President John F. Kennedy once said,
"[O]ur Nation is founded on the principle that observance of the law
is the eternal safeguard of liberty and defiance of the law is the surest
road to tyranny."39
VII. THE JUDICIARY
A. Voir Dire
The French term "voir dire" means "[t]o speak the truth."39'
"Voir dire is the face-to-face courtroom examination of prospective
jurors for the purpose of ascertaining their ability and competency to
decide a particular controversy. "3 Voir dire aids in fulfilling defen-
dants' Sixth Amendment constitutional guarantee of trial by an im-
partial jury of their peers.33 This right of impartiality, however, does
388. See George C. Christie, Lawful Departures from Legal Rules: "Jury Nul-
lification" and Legitimated Disobedience, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1289, 1303 (1974).
389. See id.
390. President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the Nation
on the Situation at the University of Mississippi (Sept. 30, 1962) in 1962 PUB.
PAPERS 726-27.
391. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990).
392. Debra K. Buteyn, Note, People v. Williams: Expansion of the Permissible
Scope of Voir Dire in the California Courts, 15 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 381, 381
(1982); see also Beth S. Ayres, Note, Preempting the Peremptory: An Examina-
tion of J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REv. 233, 234
(1994) (defining "voir dire" as "the stage of the jury selection process at which
the judge, the attorneys, or both, question prospective jurors in an attempt to un-
cover potential biases").
Jury selection first begins with a pool of qualified citizens called to serve
on jury duty for a specified time period. See Roger C. Harper, Note, Rethinking
Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 85 COLuM. L. REv. 1357, 1358 (1985).
From the jury pool, the court randomly chooses individuals for a specified trial to
be venirepersons. The court then poses questions to the venirepersons during
voir dire and removes certain individuals with either challenges for cause or per-
emptory challenges. "The process of seating a venire, conducting voir dire, and
exercising challenges continues until a sufficient number of jurors has been se-
lected." Id. at 1359.
393. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Kelly v. Trans Globe Travel-Bureau, Inc., 60
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not include the right to jury nullification.394 Although the impartial
jury possesses the power to nullify, it does not have the "right" to ig-
nore the law.395 During voir dire, if a juror expresses an unwillingness
to follow the law, the court can remove the juror from the panel.396
Thus, the court may use voir dire as a pre-trial tool to avoid jury nul-
lification for the benefit of both parties to the case.
1. Challenges for cause and peremptory challenges
In California, voir dire generally begins with the trial judge ask-
ing the venirepersons questions regarding occupation, marital status,
prior jury experience, and law enforcement experience, among other
preliminary questions." Next, in civil cases, both parties normally
conduct their own voir dire on the pool of potential jurors."' How-
ever, in California criminal matters, the court conducts voir dire and
may, at its discretion, allow counsel to conduct additional voir dire.
It is after this questioning of potential jurors that both parties and the
judge have the opportunity to raise challenges-for example, objec-
tions to the potential juror's qualifications for selection."' Challenges
for cause and peremptory challenges preserve the constitutional right
to an impartial jury."
Cal. App. 3d 195,203, 131 Cal. Rptr. 488,493 (1976).
394. See Lee v. State, 743 P.2d 296, 300 (Wyo. 1987) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
But see Korroch & Davidson, supra note 10, at 133 (arguing that the court should
allow argument and instructions on jury nullification); Andrew D. Leipold, Re-
thinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REv. 253, 255-56 (1996) (contending there
has been a movement to require judges to instruct juries on their power to nul-
lify).
395. See United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 106 (11th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489,494 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
396. See Poyner v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 815, 825 (Va. 1985).
397. See Emily M. De Falla, Note, Voir Dire for California's Civil Trials: Ap-
plying the Williams Standard, 39 HASTINGs L.J. 517,521 & n.17 (1988).
39& See id. at 521.
399. See id.
400. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1965); Buteyn, supra note
392, at 383 & n.15; see also CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR,
EFFEcrivE JURY VOIR DIRE 6 (1987) [hereinafter CEB] (stating that voir dire
questioning is used to determine whether challenges for cause or peremptory
challenges are appropriate).
Voir dire differs in civil and criminal cases in the number of peremptory
challenges allowed. In civil cases, the court allows each party between six and
eight peremptory challenges. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231(c) (West Supp.
1997); CAL. SUPER. CT. R. 228 (1996) (discussing judicial rules on voir dire ex-
amination in civil trials). In criminal cases seeking the death sentence, the court
allows each party twenty peremptory challenges. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
231(a). In all other criminal trials the court allows each party ten peremptory
challenges unless the crime is punishable by imprisonment of 90 days or less, in
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Challenges for cause allow the removal of "jurors who are un-
able to fulfill the Sixth Amendment's mandate of impartiality be-
cause of either actual prejudice or prejudice implied from the juror's
relationship to the case or the parties." 1 There is no limit on how
many jurors the judge may dismiss based upon an attorney's chal-
lenge for cause.' Challenges for cause-that is, for actual or implied
bias-must be disclosed on the record and found by the court to be
sufficient in law.' The court will sustain a challenge for cause based
upon actual bias when the juror's state of mind or attitude towards
the parties inhibits the juror from being impartial.4 On the other
hand, statutory grounds govern challenges for cause based upon im-
plied biases.45 The court will automatically presume implied bias if
any juror falls within specified statutory categories, which include
being related to the defendant, being adversely involved in a civil ac-
tion with the defendant, or having served on the grand jury that
brought about the defendant's indictment.0
which case, the court allows each party six peremptory challenges. See CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 231(a)-(b).
401. Buteyn, supra note 392, at 383.
402- See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice and Juror, 20 GA. L. REV. 257, 283
(1986).
403. See Edward V. Byrne, The Demise of the Peremptory Challenge: Evis-
ceration of an Ancient Privilege, 42 KAN. L. REV. 15, 17 (1994).
404. See Buteyn, supra note 392, at 383-84.
405. See id. at 384.
406. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1074 (West 1997). The only grounds to bring a
challenge based upon implied bias are as follows:
1. Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person al-
leged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the
prosecution was instituted, or to the defendant.
2. Standing in the relation of guardian and ward, conservator and con-
servatee, attorney and client, master and servant, or landlord and tenant,
or being a member of the family of the defendant, or of the person al-
leged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the
prosecution was instituted, or in his employment on wages.
3. Being a party adverse to the defendant in a civil action, or having
complained against or been accused by him in a criminal prosecution.
4. Having served on the grand jury which found the indictment, or on a
coroner's jury which inquired into the death of a person whose death is
the subject of the indictment or information.
5. Having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the
offense charged.
6. Having been one of a jury formerly sworn to try the same charge, and
whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict,
after the case was submitted to it.
7. Having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defen-
dant for the act charged as an offense.
8. If the offense charged be punishable with death, the entertaining of
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Peremptory challenges to excuse a potential juror do not require
a showing of cause.4 The challenge is "without explanation and
without judicial scrutiny. '" "Time and scope restraints on voir dire
questioning require a vehicle to remove those jurors who seem to be
biased but whose answers do not evince a reason rising to the level
necessary to sustain a challenge for cause." Even when an attorney
cannot prove that a prospective juror is biased, the peremptory chal-
lenge allows for the removal of that juror in question.410
However, there is a constitutional limitation on the use of per-
emptory challenges. Peremptory challenges cannot be used if they
are based solely upon a "group bias."4  Group bias occurs "when a
party presumes that certain jurors are biased merely because they are
members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious,
ethnic, or similar grounds. 4 12 The use of peremptory challenges
rooted in a group bias upsets the natural demographics of the venire,
thereby violating the defendant's constitutional right to be tried by a
jury selected from a representative cross-section of the community.43
The peremptory challenge is a very meaningful tool to the trial
lawyer. To effectively use the peremptory challenge, "it must be
prefaced by a voir dire examination that is sufficiently broad in scope
to permit the attorney to discover a juror's bias. 414 Consequently,
the historical scope of voir dire has grown to "include questions de-
signed to elicit information helpful to the intelligent exercise of per-
emptory challenges.""41
such conscientious opinions as would preclude his finding the defendantguilty; in which case he must neither be permitted nor compelled to
serve as a juror.
Id.
407. See Harper, supra note 392, at 1359.
408. See id. (quoting Swain v. United States, 380 U.S. 202,212 (1965)).
409. Harper, supra note 392, at 1360. But see CEB, supra note 400, at 25
(stating that many attorneys exercise peremptory challenges based upon a"hunch").
410. See Harper, supra note 392, at 1360.
411. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276-77, 583 P.2d 748, 761-62, 148
Cal. Rptr. 890, 903 (1978). Both the prosecution and the defense can bring a
"Wheeler Motion" before the court to challenge the alleged unconstitutional use
of the peremptory challenge. See id.
412- Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
413. De Falla, supra note 397, at 523
414. See id.
415. Id.
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2. A historical look at voir dire
In 1855 the court in People v. Backus1 6 established the right of
counsel to examine the venire prior to a challenge. However, in the
1912 decision of People v. Edwards,417 the court held that counsel did
not have a right to voir dire the venire "solely for the purpose of a
peremptory challenge or for the allowance of questions which do not
tend to prove some fact material to a challenge for cause."4 ' The
court noted that there was an increasing tendency for counsel to
abuse voir dire by questioning the venire for extended periods of
time in the hopes of eliciting a basis for a peremptory challenge.419
The court concluded that proper examination of the venire could be
accomplished by mimicking the federal practice of having the attor-
ney submit questions to the court, which in turn, would question the
venire.4a
"Despite the Edwards decision, the problem of lengthy and in-
ordinate voir dire continued, and in 1927 the Commission for the Re-
form of Criminal Procedure in California recommended the enact-
ment of a statute to govern the procedure." 42' The Commission
proposed the following statute: "It shall be the duty of the trial court
to examine the prospective jurors and to select a fair and impartial
jury. He may, in his discretion, permit reasonable examination of
prospective jurors by counsel for the people and for the defendant.",
4
The legislature, however, did not enact that specific version; instead it
enacted Penal Code section 1078.42 Penal Code section 1078 stated:
"It shall be the duty of the trial court to examine the prospective ju-
rors to select a fair and impartial jury. He shall permit reasonable
examination of prospective jurors by counsel for the people and for
the defendant., 4A Later, in 1974, the legislature amended Penal Code
section 1078 to provide that the judge "shall permit reasonable ex-
amination of prospective jurors by counsel for the people and for the
416. 5 Cal. 275 (1855).
417. 163 Cal. 752, 127 P. 58 (1912).
418. Id. at 754-55, 127 P. at 59.
419. See id. at 753, 127 P. at 58.
420. See People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d 815, 824, 506 P.2d 193, 199, 106 Cal. Rptr.
369, 375 (1973).
421. Id. at 822, 506 P.2d at 197, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
422 Id. (quoting REPORT OF THE COMM'N FOR THE REFORM OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IN CALIFORNIA at 19 (1927)).
423. See id.
424. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1078) (repealed
1997).
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defendant, such examination to be conducted orally and directly by
counsel.
,41
5
In 1981 the California Supreme Court in People v. Williams
426
abandoned the rule expressed in Edwards.Z The court criticized the
Edwards rule as being arbitrary, difficult to apply, and insensitive to
the defendant's constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury.4
Williams defined the scope of voir dire by stating that counsel "should
be allowed to ask questions reasonably designed to assist in the intel-
ligent exercise of peremptory challenges whether or not such ques-
tions are also likely to uncover grounds sufficient to sustain a chal-
lenge for cause."'4 29 The court in Williams further stated that endless
and unfocused questioning of jurors should not be tolerated by the
court.4 Yet, "expedition should not be pursued at the cost of the
quality of justice." '431 The court left intact the "considerable discre-
tion of the trial court to contain voir dire within reasonable limits.
432
In 1990 the law governing voir dire changed yet again. The pas-
sage of section 7 of Proposition 115 placed restrictions on voir dire.
The California Code of Civil Procedure, section 223, as amended by
Proposition 115, provides that the court shall conduct voir dire, but
counsel may conduct voir dire on the venire upon a showing of good
cause.433 The Code of Civil Procedure, section 223, states:
In a criminal case, the court shall conduct the examina-
tion of prospective jurors. However, the court may permit
the parties, upon a showing of good cause, to supplement
the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper,
or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors upon such a
showing, such additional questions by the parties as it deems
proper ....
Examination of prospective jurors shall be conducted
only in aid of the exercise of challenges for cause.
The trial court's exercise of its discretion in the manner
425. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1078 (West 1996) (repealed 1997).
426. 29 Cal. 3d 392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1981).
427. See id. at 398, 628 P.2d at 871, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
42& See id. at 398-99, 628 P.2d at 871, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
429. Id. at 407, 628 P.2d at 877, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 325; see also Franklin Delano
Strier, Through the Jurors' Eyes, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1988, at 78, 80 [hereinafter
Strier, Jurors' Eyes] (discussing the rule expressed in Edwards).
430. See Willhirns, 29 Cal. 3d at 408, 628 P.2d at 877, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
431. Id. (quoting United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650, 652 (6th Cir. 1973)).
432. Id.
433. See CAL. CIv. PROc. CODE § 223 (West Supp. 1997).
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in which voir dire is conducted shall not cause any convic-
tion to be reversed unless the exercise of that discretion has
resulted in a miscarriage of justice, as specified in Section 13
of Article VI of the California Constitution.4
The Code of Civil Procedure, section 223, as amended, is the
current California law regarding voir dire by counsel.
3. Scope of voir dire
Voir dire explores the "subtle nuances" of the venireperson's
conscience to ascertain any predispositions regarding the case at
hand.4 35 This process "functions as a method.., to ensure that the
jury is composed of qualified individuals who are competent to de-
termine the factual issues presented without bias, prejudice, or par-
tiality."436 However, counsel may not use voir dire to preview the
case for jurors, to persuade the jurors to take a particular stance on
the issues, or to prejudice the jury for or against a party.4- The limi-
tation of scope of inquiry during voir dire, intended to avoid abuses
and meet the goal of impartiality, lies with the discretion of the
court.
4 38
In People v. Champion,439 the California Supreme Court deter-
mined the permissible scope of voir dire. The jury found Stephen
Allen Champion guilty of one count of burglary and two counts of
murder.4 Defense counsel had previously made a motion to limit
the scope of the questions during voir dire.44' Defense counsel had
requested that prospective jurors be asked a maximum of four ques-
434. 1d
435. See Buteyn, supra note 392, at 381 (citing Crawford v. Bounds, 395 F.2d
297, 312 (4th Cir. 1968)).
436. IL
437. See People v. Visciotti, 2 Cal. 4th 1, 47-48, 825 P.2d 388, 412, 5 Cal. Rptr.
2d 495, 519 (1992). But see Strier, Jurors' Eyes, supra note 429, at 80 (asserting
that voir dire is used to condition jurors rather than to select them).
438. See People v. Lucas, 12 Cal. 4th 415, 479, 907 P.2d 373, 414, 48 Cal. Rptr.
2d 525, 566 (1995); People v. Champion, 9 Cal. 4th 879, 908, 891 P.2d 93, 107, 39
Cal. Rptr. 2d 547, 561 (1995); Visciotti, 2 Cal. 4th at 48, 825 P.2d at 412, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 519; People v. Pinholster, 1 Cal. 4th 865, 915, 824 P.2d 571, 589, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 765, 783 (1992); People v. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d 787, 829, 819 P.2d 436,
463, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 723; People v. Mason, 52 Cal. 3d 909, 939, 802 P.2d 950,
966, 277 Cal. Rptr. 166, 182 (1991); People v. Johnson, 47 Cal. 3d 1194, 1224, 767
P.2d 1047, 1059, 255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 581 (1989).
439. 9 Cal. 4th 879,891 P.2d 93,39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547 (1995).
440. See id at 897, 891 P.2d at 100, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 554.
441. See id- at 907, 891 P.2d at 107, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 561.
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tions and that the jurors limit their answers to "yes" or "no. 442
The supreme court held that the permissible scope of voir dire
rests in the discretion of the trial court."3 Accordingly, "[t]he trial
court was under no duty to limit the prospective jurors to 'yes or no'
answers, or to limit voir dire in the manner suggested by defendant
Champion. '' 4
In People v. Mason,"5 defense counsel for David Edwin Mason
proposed a voir dire question that the trial court would not allow be-
fore potential jurors. 6 The defendant argued that the trial court had
impermissibly limited the scope of voir dire."7
A jury convicted Mason of five counts of first degree murder.44
Within a ten-month period, the defendant had entered the homes of
four elderly people, burglarized the victims, and then strangled them
to death.449 The age of his victims ranged from seventy-two to eighty-
three years old.4' The fifth murder was of a fellow inmate named
Boyd Johnson.45' Mason strangled Johnson and then hung him from a
shower rod with a towel to make it appear as though Johnson had
committed suicide.452
Defense counsel wanted to pose a question to the venire that
would ask the individuals to assume that they, as jurors, had found
Mason guilty of five counts of first degree murder.53 Defense counsel
wanted to inquire, based upon the evidence in the following question,
whether the venire would vote for death:
[Flour of the murder victims were elderly; one was 69, [two]
in their 70's and one who was 83 years old; that each of the
elderly victims ... was beaten and then strangled to death;
that each of the [four] elderly victims was robbed of a small
amount of money or goods; that in the [fifth] case, the kill-
ing of Boyd Johnson, that Boyd Johnson was an inmate in
the jail along with Mr. Mason and that Mr. Johnson was
beaten and then strangled and then hung with a noose from
442. See id.
443. See id at 908, 891 P.2d at 107, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 561.
444. Id.
445. 52 Cal. 3d 909, 802 P.2d 950, 277 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1991).
446. See id. at 940, 802 P.2d at 967, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
447. See id at 939, 802 P.2d at 966, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
44& See id at 918, 802 P.2d at 953, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
449. See id at 919, 802 P.2d at 953, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
450. See id.
451. See id.
452. See id. at 926, 802 P.2d at 958, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
453. See id. at 940 n.9, 802 P.2d at 967 n.9, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 183 n.9.
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a shower curtain rod 4
The California Supreme Court found that the defense counsel's
question would give the jurors a highlight of the facts of the case and
would compel the jurors to make a decision to vote in a particular
way before the trial's completion. 5  The court further stated that
"[i]t is not a proper object of voir dire to obtain a juror's advisory
opinion based upon a preview of the evidence." 456 The court held that
the trial court had properly exercised its discretion in limiting voir
dire.
Like Mason, People v. Visciott4 is a case in which voir dire pos-
sibly exceeded its permissible scope. Yet, in this case, defense coun-
sel failed to object to the prosecution's questioning.459 In Visciotti,
John Louis Visciotti was tried and convicted by a jury of first degree
murder, attempted murder, and robbery.' Visciotti and Brian
Hefner needed extra money, so they devised a plan to rob two of
their coworkers."' Visciotti and Hefner led the two coworkers to a
remote area and robbed them.4 2 After the robbery, Visciotti shot the
first coworker.43 The bullet grazed the heart and entered the lung of
the first coworker, causing him to die of blood loss.4 Visciotti then
shot the second coworker in the torso, shoulder, and eye, leaving him
for dead.45 Fortunately, the second coworker survived the attack.7
The defendant claimed that during voir dire, the prosecution bi-
ased the jury by using case specific hypothetical questions to condi-
tion or forewarn the venire.7 The prosecution asked one prospective
454. Id
455. See id. at 940, 802 P.2d at 967, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
456. See id.
457. See id.
458. 2 Cal. 4th 1, 825 P.2d 388,5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 495 (1992).
459. See id- at 47-48, 825 P.2d at 412, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 519.
460. See id. at 27-28, 825 P.2d at 398, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 505.
461. See id. at 28-29, 825 P.2d at 399, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 506.
462 See id.
463. See id. at 29, 825 P.2d at 399, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 506.
464. See id.
465. See id.
466. See id.
467. See id. at 36, 825 P.2d at 404, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 511. The defendant's
complaint of indoctrinating the jury is known as improper "Hovey voir dire." See
id. at 47, 825 P.2d at 412, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 519. Hovey voir dire seeks to deter-
mine if, because of his views on capital punishment, any prospective juror would"vote against the death penalty without regard to the evidence produced at trial."
People v. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d 583, 597, 789 P.2d 127, 136, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399, 408
(1990) (quoting People v. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d 207, 250, 763 P.2d 906, 929, 253 Cal.
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juror the following question to determine whether, under such facts,
the juror would be able to vote for the death penalty:
If we get to the penalty phase, if we get that far, then you've
already found the man guilty of first degree murder. It's a
horrible crime. And you found he committed this murder
while he was engaged in a robbery, based on facts that
would be something like a man decides to commit a rob-
bery, arms himself with a handgun to make sure he's suc-
cessful, robs his victim. During the course of the robbery it
occurs to him that if the victim is not alive, there won't be
anybody going to the police and complain .... So, realizing
that, the robber points his gun at the victim, pulls the trig-
ger, shoots him once through the heart and kills him.'
The California Supreme Court stated that the questioning re-
garding the death penalty phase of the trial should be framed to de-
termine whether the prospective juror would refuse to vote for the
death penalty regardless of the evidence presented at trial. 9 "It was
not necessary, therefore, to permit extensive questioning of the pro-
spective jurors during... voir dire regarding their willingness to im-
pose the death penalty based on the anticipated facts of, or a hypo-
thetical set of facts based on, the case to be tried."'47
The court noted that it would not presume, even if the question-
ing was beyond the permissible scope of voir dire, that defense coun-
sel should have objected to such a line of questioning.47" The court
held that "[a]bsent a timely objection... any claim of abuse of dis-
cretion is deemed to have been waived."4 2
Rptr. 55, 78 (1988); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 416 (1985); see also Strier,
Juror's Eyes supra note 429, at 80 (stating that a judge's survey indicated that up
to eighty percent of voir dire questioning used by attorneys is to try to indoctri-
nate the jurors).
468. Visciotti, 2 Cal. 4th at 46, 825 P.2d at 411, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518.
469. See id. at 47, 825 P.2d at 412,5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 519, 1 Cal. 4th 865, 915,824
P.2d 571,590,4 Cal. Rptr 2d 765,784 (1992).
470. Id.; see also Pinholster, 1 Cal. 4th 865, 915, 824 P.2d 571, 590, 4 Cal. Rptr.
765, 784 (1992) (stating that the trial court has discretion to limit the scope of voir
dire when the questions are couched with facts similar to the case at hand in or-
der to prevent indoctrinating the jury).
471. See Visciotti, 2 Cal. 4th at 47 n.17, 825 P.2d at 412 n.17, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
519 n.17.
472. Id. at 48, 825 P.2d at 412, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 519; see also Rousseau v. West
Coast House Movers, 256 Cal. App. 2d 878, 881, 64 Cal. Rptr. 655, 658 (1967)
(stating that failure to make a timely objection to the court's voir dire examina-
tion precludes a future attack on such grounds); cf. Clark, 3 Cal. 4th at 155, 833
P.2d at 625, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618 (contending that where the defense has not
fully exercised the allotted peremptory challenges and fails to assert dissatisfac-
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The responsibility to conduct voir dire lies first with the court. If
counsel is given the opportunity to conduct voir dire, counsel must
make a careful inquiry of the potential jurors to try to safeguard
against jury nullification.
4. The need to guard against nullification
The main goal of voir dire is to protect a defendant's constitu-
tional right to a trial by an impartial and fair jury.473 "The require-
ment of impartiality demands that voir dire examination serve as a
filter capable of screening out prospective jurors who are unable to
lay aside any opinion as to [fault or as to] guilt or innocence and ren-
der a verdict based on the evidence presented in court."474 In serving
the demands of impartiality, voir dire can also help prevent impanel-
ing a jury likely to nullify.
Many of the cases depicting the scope of voir dire are death
penalty cases."7 They offer a helpful insight into the proper scope of
questioning on jury nullification. The court determines jury nullifi-
cation based upon the intricate facts of each case. Under Williams
and Mason it is clear that attorneys may not question the venire on
particular facts that might preview the case at hand to determine if a
potential juror might lean towards nullification. Yet, an attorney
may pose the simple question: Would you follow the law even if you
did not agree with it? This type of questioning aids in creating the
basis for a peremptory challenge as suggested under Williams. Thus,
voir dire can be a vital instrument to probe whether or not a potential
juror may tend to refuse to follow the law and thus can help prevent
tion with the selected jury, then any error in including unwanted prospective ju-
rors is harmless).
473. See United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428,434 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
474. Id.
475. See People v. Lucas, 12 Cal. 4th 415, 476, 907 P.2d 373, 412, 48 Cal. Rptr.
2d 495, 564 (1995); People v. Sanders, 11 Cal. 4th 475, 475, 905 P.2d 420, 420, 46
Cal. Rptr. 2d 751,751 (1995); People v. Champion, 9 Cal. 4th 879, 891 P.2d 93, 39
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 547 (1995); People v. Kirkpatrick, 7 Cal. 4th 988, 988, 874 P.2d
248, 248, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 818, 818 (1994); Visciotti, 2 Cal. 4th at 1, 825 P.2d at 388,
5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 495; Pinholster, 1 Cal. 4th at 865, 824 P.2d at 571, 4 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 765; People v. Mason, 52 Cal. 3d 909, 802 P.2d 950, 277 Cal. Rptr. 166
(1991); see also Stephen Gillers, Proving the Prejudice of Death-Qualified Juries
After Adams v. Texas, 47 U. PruT. L. Rav. 219,225-26 (1985) (discussing the pre-
vention of jury nullification by voir dire in death penalty cases).
476. See People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 408, 628 P.2d 869, 877, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 317, 325 (1981); Mason, 52 Cal. 3d at 940, 802 P.2d at 967, 277 Cal. Rptr. at
183.
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jury nullification.
The court must uproot potential jurors' tendencies to ignore the
law prior to trial. At the conclusion of trial, the court cannot require
the jury to give a justification of its verdict.4' "Juries thus can intro-
duce into the law a flexibility and responsiveness to special circum-
stances that may [seem to] be important to its public acceptance." 478
Jury nullification is a "covert and illegitimate power, dangerous to
the proper functioning of law." 79 Voir dire must guard against nulli-
fication so that passion, mercy, bias, or prejudice does not determine
the outcome of trials.
B. What Judges and Lawyers Can Do to Avoid Nullification
Proper voir dire can aid in the prevention of nullification. Al-
though no instruction on jury nullification is given, a lack of instruc-
tion will not necessarily prevent jurors from nullifying. Jurors must
be educated about their duty to apply the facts, as they determine
them to be, to the law given to them by the judge. Affirmative steps
must be taken by the court and counsel to avoid empaneling a jury
prone to nullify.
1. A suggested technique for the court to follow
The court can help prevent jury nullification by conducting a
thorough examination of potential jurors during the voir dire process.
In conducting voir dire, the court should focus on the jurors' ability to
follow the law, to be a fair judge of all witnesses, to set aside personal
beliefs and biases, to overcome personal opinions towards the defen-
dant, and to disregard the penalty when making a decision.
In a case which lends itself to jury nullification concerns, a
chambers conference between the judge and all counsel should take
place prior to jury selection. If the judge does not invite such a
meeting, counsel should request it. During the conference, the judge
should instruct counsel regarding voir dire and the scope of question-
ing.
Essential to the voir dire process is the oath administered to
477. See Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amend-
ment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 512 (1986); see also
Leipold, supra note 394, at 255 n.5 (asserting that the difficulty in determining
why a jury reached a particular verdict makes it hard to provide specific case ex-
amples of nullification).
478. Massaro, supra note 477, at 512.
479. Zalman & Gates, supra note 332, at 221.
[Vol. 31:1
JURY NULLIFICATION
jurors. The court clerk gives the following oath to the prospective
jury panel:
You do, and each of you, understand and agree that you will
accurately and truthfully answer, under penalty of perjury,
all questions propounded to you concerning your qualifica-
tions and competency to serve as a trial juror in the matter
pending before this court; and that failure to do so may
subject you to criminal prosecution.'
Reminding jurors of this oath may help them search deeper when an-
swering voir dire questions.
The distribution of literature advocating nullification encour-
aged Los Angeles criminal judges to remind jurors of their respon-
sibility to tell the truth during voir dire questioning. To focus jurors
on their obligation, judges should advise jurors that their verdicts
should be based only on the evidence presented in court and on the
law as stated by the court.
One successful technique the court can use to avoid jury nullifi-
cation is to pose a two-sided coin scenario during voir dire. For ex-
ample, jurors are asked in both criminal and civil cases whether they
have any family or friends in law enforcement. Assume one juror has
a close relative who is a police officer with whom the juror keeps in
close contact and for whom the juror has high regard. At this point it
is vital for the court to inquire whether this juror can put aside per-
sonal feelings for the relative while evaluating the credibility and ve-
racity of witness testimony. The concern is that the juror will give
more weight to a police officer's testimony merely because that per-
son is a police officer. The court must ask the juror whether the juror
will evaluate the credibility of all witnesses by the same standards.
The same is true on the flip side of the coin. For example, as-
sume that potential jurors indicate that they have had primarily
negative experiences with law enforcement. Jurors may express
cynicism or a lack of trust for law enforcement. Here again, it is vital
that the court inquire as to whether this juror can set aside those per-
sonal feelings and judge each witness fairly and consistently and by
the same standards.
The court needs to convey that there may be many different
480. Memorandum from James A. Bascue, Supervising Judge of the Central
Criminal Division, Los Angeles Superior Court, to All Judges Assigned to Cen-
tral Criminal Division, Los Angeles Superior Court (Jan. 23, 1996) (on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter Bascue].
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witnesses testifying before the jury. Whether the witness be a police
officer, school teacher, trash collector, lawyer, car dealer, priest, or
rabbi, the jurors need to consider each witness as equally credible
when the witness steps on the stand to begin to testify. Once the wit-
ness testifies and the juror has had the ability to evaluate the witness'
demeanor and statements, then the juror may properly evaluate the
credibility of the witness.
The next step is for the court to stress the juror's obligation to in-
form the court if a fellow juror violates the oath. The court should
ask the potential jurors: Is there anyone here who would not have
the courage to tell me that a fellow juror refuses to follow the law or
has violated his or her oath? Do each and every one of you have the
courage to do this?
Informing the jury of a true occurrence here proves to be invalu-
able. For example, in 1995 a courageous juror, after being instructed
by the court as suggested above, sent a note to the court at the very
beginning of jury deliberations. In part the note stated, in effect,
that: One juror stated prior to deliberation that he would not find
the defendant guilty on the felony charge. He stated that in his own
opinion that all police were corrupt and he would not take seriously
what any of them said."' The juror advised the court that the
"offending juror" was not willing to discuss the testimony of any po-
lice officers because of his predisposition. The court conducted a
hearing and thereafter discharged the offending juror.
The ability of jurors to follow the law can also be examined by
questioning on the decriminalization of drugs. This approach works
well in any type of case, regardless of whether drugs are involved. To
.illustrate the point, assume that a criminal drug case is before the
court. Assume further that there is a potential juror who believes in
the legalization of all drugs. The court has a responsibility in such a
situation to ask the juror: "Would you be able to follow the law
whether or not you believe in the law?"
During such an examination of the venire, if a juror states that
due to personal beliefs he or she will be unable to follow the law, the
juror will be excused. If the jurors state that they can follow the law
despite these beliefs, the jurors may remain on the panel. The jurors'
willingness to follow the law indicates a psychological commitment to
both the court and to the other jurors.
This technique impresses upon the venire the obligation to
481. From a personal experience in Judge Crispo's court room.
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follow the law. Moreover, this method of examination imposes the
psychological persuasion on the individual jurors to follow the law or
face the probability of being challenged by other jurors for attempt-
ing to disregard the law in jury deliberations.
Another crucial area for the court to inquire into emphasizes the
juror's responsibility to set aside personal feelings toward the party.
The potential jurors must be informed that they cannot make a deci-
sion based upon their like or dislike of the party.
Further, the venire must be informed that it is not to consider
punishment in reaching a verdict. Three-strike criminal cases have
posed serious nullification problems.42 Jurors often feel that the
punishment is too severe and choose not to follow the law.' The ju-
rors need to understand that they are the judges of the facts and evi-
dence in the case, not the judges of the proper sentence for the
crimes.
Again, demonstrating the success of highlighting the jury's
proper role and scope, the 1995 note stated in effect that his fellow
juror stated that he would not put the defendant, Mr. [X], "a nice
guy" in prison for ten to fifteen years.4 The juror who sent the letter
understood and took seriously the court's questions on insuring that a
decision in the case was not based either upon personal feelings
about the defendant or upon punishment.
The final question in this technique the court should pose to the
jury is: Mr. or Ms. Smith, please search your mind, your heart, and
your soul-is there any reason whatsoever why you could not apply
the law, as given to you by the court, to the facts as you find them, as
judges of those facts, and be fair to each of the parties? This inquiry
reiterates the significance of the jury's obligation to follow the law
and morally persuades each juror to render a verdict according to the
law.
After a panel is chosen, jurors are asked to take another oath.
This oath states: "You do and each of you understand and agree that
you will well and truly try the cause now pending before this court,
and a true verdict render according only to the evidence presented to
you and to the instructions of the court."'
Prior to leaving the courtroom to deliberate, the jurors are
482. See Cox, supra note 306, at Al.
483. See id.
484. From a personal experience in Judge Crispo's court room.
485. Bascue, supra note 480.
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minded of this oath. In this last reminder, the court has fulfilled its
attempt to guard against jury nullification through the voir dire
process.
2. Using jury instructions as a preventive tool
Required instructions in California inform jurors that you "must
base the decisions you make on the facts and the law. First, you must
determine the facts from the evidence received in the trial and not
from any other source. A 'fact' is something proved by the evidence
or by stipulation."
The jury is instructed further regarding functions of the jury and
the court. Jurors are instructed that they are the triers of fact and
must apply the law as given them by the court, regardless of whether
or not they agree with the law. The instruction also stresses that ju-
rors "must not be influenced by pity for or prejudice against a defen-
dant .... You must not be influenced by mere sentiment, conjecture,
sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling."4"
This is the closest "non-nullification" instruction California courts
include. An outright anti-nullification instruction would be self-
defeating. "Such an instruction is like telling children not to put
beans in their noses. Most of them would not have thought of it had
it not been suggested." 48
Other instructions in California include reminding jurors how to
conduct themselves during the course of trial. Jurors "must not dis-
cuss this case with any other person except a fellow juror, and then
only after the case is submitted to [them]." 9 Another instruction
educates the jury on how to approach reaching a verdict and touches
the core of nullification:
The attitude and conduct of jurors at all times are very im-
portant. It is rarely helpful for a juror at the beginning of
deliberations to express an emphatic opinion on the case or
to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict.
When one does that at the outset, a sense of pride may be
aroused, and one may hesitate to change a position even if
shown it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or
486. CALJIC, supra note 235, No. 0.50.
487. CALJIC, supra note 235, No. 1.00.
488. Judge Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury Nullification: When May and
Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 AM. GRIM. L. REv. 239, 250
(1993), reprinted in JAcK B. WEiNsTErN, 4 Vom DiRE 5, 9 (1995).
489. CAL.IC, supra note 235, No. 1.03.
[Vol. 31:1
JURY NULLIFICATION
advocates in this matter. You are impartial judges of the
facts.
41
These instructions clarify the importance of the jurors' task.
Similar to opening statements, early instructions can focus jurors on
their task, and on how to evaluate the evidence as it is presented.
Thus, offering jury instructions on the law at the beginning of trial
can be an effective means of guarding against nullification.
The current practice of instructing the jury at the end of closing
arguments has been analogized to "telling jurors to watch a baseball
game and to determine who won without telling them the rules until
the game is over. , 41 Partial instructions to jurors at the beginning of
trial can be highly effective. Although those instructions will be re-
stated at the conclusion of the case, a valuable opportunity will be
lost by waiting until immediately before deliberations to present
them.
3. Recommendation for specified criminal cases
In criminal cases prosecutors should refrain from overcharging,
especially in cases of fraud or tax evasion. The evidence is very con-
fusing to jurors, and numerous charges make the situation worse. It
is easy for jurors to ignore instructions and evidence they do not un-
derstand, regardless of its weight.
Criminal cases requiring long-term sequestration may also lead
to jury nullification. The simple solution is to not sequester juries for
long periods of time.42 Commenting on the O.J. Simpson case, jury
consultant Jo-Ellan Dimitrious said, "[y]ou can't sequester people for
this long without something happening." '493 Keeping people away
from their homes, family, and friends causes resentment which, over
time, easily turns to anger. An angry jury may not always care about
the instructions of the court and may decide not to follow the law.
VIII. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS
Currently, Maryland and Indiana are the only states that provide
a nullification instruction. In both states, the instruction is approved
490. CALJIC, supra note 235, No. 17.41.
491. Albert W. Alschuler, Our Faltering Jury, 122 PUB. INTEREST, Winter
1996, at 28, 36-37 (1996) (quoting Judge William Schwarzer of the California
Northern District Court).
492. See Cox, supra note 306, at Al.
493. ld.
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for use in criminal trials only.4" In Indiana, nullification is a right
from the Indiana Constitution, which provides: "In all criminal cases
whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the
facts." '495 The Maryland Constitution also provides a similar right and
states that, "[i]n the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the
Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction. '  The in-
struction given in Maryland is generally vague and usually states:
Members of the Jury, this is a criminal case and under the
Constitution and the laws of the State of Maryland in a
criminal case the jury are the judges of the law as well as of
the facts in the case. So that whatever I tell you about the
law while it is intended to be helpful to you in reaching a
just and proper verdict in the case, it is not binding upon
you as members of the jury and you may accept or reject it.
And you may apply the law as you apprehend it to be in the
case. 
497
The right of jurors to nullify is not a right embodied in either the
United States or the California Constitutions. There is no statute or
case law within either system that provides for such a right. Never-
theless, the issue of jury nullification has faced many state legisla-
tures, including California's.
In February 1996 California State Senator Don Rogers intro-
duced a bill proposing an added provision to the Code of Civil Proce-
dure. The new section would have added the right of jurors to be in-
structed on nullification.498 The bill stated that the right to trial by
jury includes the right to tell jurors that they have the power to judge
the law and facts and vote their consciences. 49 The bill provided in
pertinent part:
(a) An accused or aggrieved party's right to trial by jury, in
all instances where the government or any of its agencies is
an opposing party, includes the right to inform the jurors of
their power to judge the law as well as the evidence, and to
vote on the verdict according to conscience.
(b) This right shall not be infringed by any statute, juror
494. See Creagan, supra note 11, at 1133.
495. IND. CONST. art. I, § 19.
496. MD. CONST. art. XXIII.
497. Wyley v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 372 F.2d 742,743 n.1 (4th Cir. 1967).
49& See S.B. 2140, 1995-1996 Legis. Sess. 99-100 (Cal. 1996).
499. See id.
[Vol. 31:1
JURY NULLIFICATION
oath, court order, or procedure or practice of the court, in-
cluding the use of any method of jury selection which could
preclude or limit the empanelment of jurors willing to exer-
cise this power.
(c) This right shall not be infringed by preventing any party
to the trial... from presenting arguments to the jury which
may pertain to issues of law and conscience, including (1)
the merit, intent, constitutionality, or applicability of the law
in the instant case; (2) the motives, moral perspective, or
circumstances of the accused or aggrieved party; (3) the de-
gree ... of guilt or actual harm done; or (4) the sanctions
which may be applied to the losing party.
(d) Failure to allow the accused or aggrieved party.., to so
inform the jury shall be grounds for mistrial and another
trial by jury.
The Senate bill failed to pass committee approval"° and was later
dropped in favor of a similar Assembly bill.'
California State Assemblyman Steve Baldwin also introduced a
bill to amend the Code of Civil Procedure to include a provision on
jury nullification."' It provided that if defense counsel submits an in-
struction, judges in misdemeanor criminal cases could instruct a jury
that it may disregard any jury instructions and render a verdict for
the defendant according to conscience.50 The bill originally in-
cluded approval of an instruction in felony cases but was later
amended to apply only to misdemeanors.o The Fully Informed Jury
Association was the only organization to register support for AB
3079.- Fortunately, the Assembly bill failed passage by a majority
vote of the Public Safety Committee on April 9, 1996."
California Attorney General Dan Lungren has stated in an advi-
sory opinion that California jurors do not have the right to refuse to
apply the law where they believe the law should not be applied in a
500. Id.
501. See id.
502. See Mike Lewis, Will the State Codify Jury Nullification?, L.A. DAILY J.,
Apr. 3, 1996, at 1.
503. See id.
504. See A.B. 3079, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. 1 (Cal. 1996).
505. See Lewis, supra note 502, at 1.
506. See id.
507. See Legislative Counsel's Digest, Complete Bill History, Apr. 19, 1996, at
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particular case.' The basic principle that ours is a government of
laws, not of individual people, is irreconcilable with the theory of jury
nullification.- Lungren's reasoning rests on the premise that our
legislative process allows general citizens to participate in the crea-
tion of laws. As such, nullification has no place in our system. 510
Lungren acknowledged that nullification may have had a place in his-
tory when law was not necessarily democratically created.5 This is
no longer the case. "The law cannot be properly developed through
appellate review if it is uncertain whether the law applied at trial was
that given by the judge or that conjured up by individual members of
the jury."012 Lungren's opinion properly maintains that remedies such
as reprieve, pardon, or commutation exist for cases which produce
unduly harsh results.513 There is no recognized right for California ju-
rors to disregard the law.
514
Outside California, legislation or constitutional amendments on
jury nullification have been presented in Washington, Arizona, New
York, Massachusetts, Louisiana, Tennessee, Texas,5 and Oregon. 16
None have become law.517
IX. CONCLUSION
While it is true that each juror brings personal life experience
and attitude to the deliberation room, it is also true that effective
safeguards can ensure an impartial jury. Jury nullification does and
will continue to occur, but courts should never encourage it. If jurors
are given instructions clearly explaining their role, reminded by the
court of their function, and asked to follow the law and not their
hearts, nullification will occur only in limited instances. If laws are
unfair or penalties too harsh, legal remedies exist to correct such
situations; nullification is not the answer. The development of legal
principles is rooted in the will of the people. If we need change in the
laws that dictate a result contrary to current societal beliefs and
508. See 77 Op. Att'y Gen. Cal. 118, 119 (1994).
509. See id. at 125.
510. See id.
511. See id.
512. Id. at 126.
513. See id.
514. See id.
515. See Creagan, supra note 11, at 1115-29.
516. See Lewis, supra note 502, at 1.
517. See Creagan, supra note 11, at 1115-29; Lewis, supra note 502, at 1.
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needs, it is up to the legislature and not juries to modify the law.58
Jurors have the "naked power" to nullify, but that power is not a
right and should be used in only the rarest of circumstances. If indi-
viduals were allowed to decide that certain laws apply to some and
not to others, true anarchy would reign. As Theodore Roosevelt
stated,
No man is above the Law, and no man is below it; nor do we
ask any man's permission when we require him to obey it.
Obedience to the law is demanded as a right, not asked as a
favor. If we allow the optional appreciation of laws, we will
have created a system in which some people are above the
law and some people are below the law.519
We must ensure that the law is upheld and followed with a
certain measure of consistency. To do otherwise would encourage
anarchy.
518. See Leipold, supra note 394, at 299. But cf. Massaro, supra note 477, at
545 (one can argue that nullification sends a message to the legislatures and
courts that they need to change the law because it is no longer in line with com-
munity standards).
519. Theodore Roosevelt, Third Annual Message (Dec. 7, 1903), reprinted in
JOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 847 (Emily Morrison Beck ed., 1968).
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